Re: [DNSOP] [Doh] [dns-privacy] New: draft-bertola-bcp-doh-clients

Paul Vixie <> Tue, 12 March 2019 22:51 UTC

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From: Paul Vixie <>
Cc: Stephen Farrell <>, "" <>, "" <>, Christian Huitema <>
Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2019 22:51:01 +0000
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Organization: Vixie Freehold
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] [Doh] [dns-privacy] New: draft-bertola-bcp-doh-clients
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On Tuesday, 12 March 2019 21:38:44 UTC Stephen Farrell wrote:
> On 12/03/2019 21:11, Paul Vixie wrote:
> > ...
> There are reasons to want confidentiality for DNS queries
> and answers, and access patterns, for which the IETF has
> achieved consensus. (See RFC7626) (*)

i have no qualms about confidentiality, for traffic allowed by a network 
operator. it's the inability to interefere (as called for in RFC 8484) and not 
the inability to observe (as called for in RFC 7626) that's at issue here.

> DoT is one way to tackle those problems. DoH is another.

DoT does not intend to place itself beyond interference by on-path entities, 
and as such, my choice as a network operator is either to allow it through 
even though i can't see the contents, or disallow it. and that's all fine.

DoH intends "to prevent on-path interference with DNS operations", and that's 
well beyond the remit of RFC 7626, and is therefore not spoken to one way or 
another by IETF consensus. i do not believe that a non-interference objective 
would reach broader IETF consensus. perhaps we can test that one day.