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Re: [DNSOP] [Ext] TKEY and MD5

Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@icann.org> Tue, 21 December 2021 15:38 UTC

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From: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@icann.org>
To: Donald Eastlake <d3e3e3@gmail.com>
CC: Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org>, dnsop WG <dnsop@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [DNSOP] [Ext] TKEY and MD5
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Date: Tue, 21 Dec 2021 15:38:05 +0000
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] [Ext] TKEY and MD5
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On Dec 20, 2021, at 8:12 PM, Donald Eastlake <d3e3e3@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> On Mon, Dec 20, 2021 at 10:42 PM Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@icann.org> wrote:
>> On Dec 20, 2021, at 6:57 PM, Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org> wrote:
>>> Isn’t it about time we updated DH support in DNS to not use MD5?  Currently there is
>>> no FIPS compatible DH key exchange in DNS.  I suspect it would be relatively straight
>>> forward by defining a new TKEY mode which does DH w/o using MD5.
>> 
>> If I read RFC 2930 correctly, there is no way to create new modes for TKEY. MD5 is baked into the TKEY RRtype, it seems. You would have to create a new RRtype which is similar to TKEY but has a different key exchange mechanism.
> 
> I don't know why you think this. Maybe I should write a draft adding a
> new TKEY mode using DH and some less primitive crypto than MD5.
> Presumably that exercise would provide some information about which of
> us is correct :-)

Gaaah, you are correct. I missed the "mode field" earlier in the draft. Yes, it would indeed be easy to make a nearly-identical mode with different hashes.

--Paul Hoffman

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