Re: [DNSOP] Questions on draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-only

Joe Abley <jabley@hopcount.ca> Thu, 30 July 2020 21:58 UTC

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From: Joe Abley <jabley@hopcount.ca>
In-Reply-To: <alpine.LRH.2.23.451.2007301639420.418549@bofh.nohats.ca>
Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2020 17:57:54 -0400
Cc: Ben Schwartz <bemasc@google.com>, dnsop <dnsop@ietf.org>
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To: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Questions on draft-ietf-dnsop-delegation-only
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On 30 Jul 2020, at 17:10, Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> wrote:

> On Thu, 30 Jul 2020, Joe Abley wrote:
> 
>> My sense is that this is a nice idea in theory but doesn't solve a problem that anybody actually has, and the camel is starting to look a little bit fraught. But I don't think any proposal should succeed or fail based on anybody's uninformed sense, hence the request for more data.
> 
> This proposal is meant to increase the amount of trust people can place in
> DNSSEC by decreasing the hard trust that is currently required of ICANN,
> Verisign and the TLD operators. I understand in our community, we do
> not see this as a big problem. Unfortunately outside our community it is.

Can you provide some information about that? I think it would be helpful to understand the problem that people are bothered by.

> It is further interesting that you raise your point of "the risk analysis
> shows we can never afford to deploy this" when a few months ago you
> raised the reverse point that "we dont want to be forced to have to use
> this to be seen trustworthy". Both arguments cannot be true.

Well, I didn't say that we can never afford to deploy anything. Clearly we can deploy lots of things all the time. I think I've explained why we couldn't just turn this on in ORG right now, and so a requirement to do so would be a problem.

The lines of code to be added to particular implementations are not the only measure of complexity in deployment, however. We don't have a good handle on all the software that exists between application and authority server, nor how it interacts. There are costs in resolution failures that appear intermittent because they happen with some applications, networks or hosts but not others, assuming that it is deployed anywhere.

If the technical difficulties for particular registries like ORG can be circumvented but the benefits are not obviously compelling, then there's the question of why any commercial registry would implement this proposal. If it needs to happen as a contractual obligation, then that means contract changes and although that's very much not my area, my sense is that that's a fairly heavy ball that needs to be rolled up a steep and tall hill. That sounds like a cost to me.

Without widespread implementation, I'm not sure how the problems (admittedly, problems that I don't really understand) will actually be addressed. The costs will remain, however. And right now I haven't heard a single example of a TLD that might be in a position to implement this (not saying there isn't one, just that I haven't heard an example).


Joe