Re: [DNSOP] opportunistic semi-authoritative caching (Re: DNSOP Call for Adoption - draft-tale-dnsop-serve-stale)

Evan Hunt <each@isc.org> Sat, 09 September 2017 18:06 UTC

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Date: Sat, 9 Sep 2017 18:06:08 +0000
From: Evan Hunt <each@isc.org>
To: Paul Vixie <paul@redbarn.org>
Cc: dnsop@ietf.org, Joe Abley <jabley@hopcount.ca>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] opportunistic semi-authoritative caching (Re: DNSOP Call for Adoption - draft-tale-dnsop-serve-stale)
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On Sat, Sep 09, 2017 at 08:29:28AM -0700, Paul Vixie wrote:
> rpz is a defense. it assumes that the content owner is trying to hurt 
> me. it is therefore one step away from being an attack, and is in any 
> case, not an attack.

Sure.  And TTL stretching assumes the content owner is a fellow victim,
and someone is trying to hurt both of us by making their site inaccessible
to me.  Both are lies; both have a defensible moral justification.

> i think that attack-p is more relevant than lie-p for this discussion.

The line between attack and not-attack can be surprisingly blurry.  But
given that there are non-malevolent reasons for wanting to serve stale
data, and solutions are being implemented (including one in BIND), I'm
okay with publishing details of the method, same as with RPZ.

-- 
Evan Hunt -- each@isc.org
Internet Systems Consortium, Inc.