From nobody Tue May 24 09:33:34 2022 Return-Path: X-Original-To: dnsop@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: dnsop@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B1845C1D3507; Tue, 24 May 2022 09:33:31 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.899 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.899 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, RCVD_IN_ZEN_BLOCKED_OPENDNS=0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([50.223.129.194]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id io7aC1FWyeeX; Tue, 24 May 2022 09:33:31 -0700 (PDT) Received: from mail.hardakers.net (mail.hardakers.net [168.150.192.181]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D4E1AC1D34F9; Tue, 24 May 2022 09:32:48 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost (unknown [10.0.0.9]) by mail.hardakers.net (Postfix) with ESMTPA id 3CF032080A; Tue, 24 May 2022 09:32:48 -0700 (PDT) From: Wes Hardaker To: Alvaro Retana via Datatracker Cc: "The IESG" , Alvaro Retana , draft-ietf-dnsop-nsec3-guidance@ietf.org, dnsop-chairs@ietf.org, dnsop@ietf.org, tjw.ietf@gmail.com References: <165219706078.31003.2473140903964739813@ietfa.amsl.com> Date: Tue, 24 May 2022 09:32:48 -0700 In-Reply-To: <165219706078.31003.2473140903964739813@ietfa.amsl.com> (Alvaro Retana via Datatracker's message of "Tue, 10 May 2022 08:37:40 -0700") Message-ID: User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/27.2 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Archived-At: Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Alvaro Retana's No Objection on draft-ietf-dnsop-nsec3-guidance-08: (with COMMENT) X-BeenThere: dnsop@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.34 Precedence: list List-Id: IETF DNSOP WG mailing list List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 24 May 2022 16:33:31 -0000 Alvaro Retana via Datatracker writes: > Should this document formally Update RFC5155? Besides providing "guidanc= e on > setting NSEC3 parameters", there is also Normative language that seems si= milar > to what is in rfc5155, but not the same. For example: >=20 > In =C2=A73.2 this document says: >=20 > Validating resolvers MAY return an insecure response to their clients > when processing NSEC3 records with iterations larger than 0. Note > also that a validating resolver returning an insecure response MUST > still validate the signature over the NSEC3 record to ensure the > iteration count was not altered since record publication (see > [RFC5155] section 10.3). >=20 > I couldn't find text in rfc5155 about how returning insecure responses is > optional, but I did find this in =C2=A710.3 that seems related to the val= idation > requirement: >=20 > A resolver MAY treat a response with a higher value as insecure, > after the validator has verified that the signature over the NSEC3 > RR is correct. >=20 > Reading further, =C2=A73.2 does say that "this specification updates [RFC= 5155]", but > there's no indication in the header or anywhere else. As discussed in other threads, the replacement version will update 5155. And yes, I agree that the returning of insecure for large values is not spelled out in a really strong way (and is one of the reasons I think the DNSOP WG thinks our document is a good update as we specify this with greater clarity). --=20 Wes Hardaker USC/ISI