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Re: [DNSOP] New Version of draft-ietf-dnsop-algorithm-update-00: Algorithm Implementation Requirements and Usage Guidance for DNSSEC

"Paul Hoffman" <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> Tue, 27 March 2018 12:43 UTC

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From: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
To: Michael Sinatra <michael@brokendns.net>
Cc: dnsop@ietf.org
Date: Tue, 27 Mar 2018 05:43:46 -0700
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] New Version of draft-ietf-dnsop-algorithm-update-00: Algorithm Implementation Requirements and Usage Guidance for DNSSEC
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On 26 Mar 2018, at 17:30, Michael Sinatra wrote:

> I am a bit uncomfortable with the document's disrecommendation of 
> SHA384
> and ECDSAP384SHA384.  The main reason for this is that for crypto
> recommendations here in the USG,

Note that those are for encryption, where they want to keep some things 
secret for 40 or more years. DNSSEC is an authentication mechanism. If 
it takes two decades to break an P256 key that is used for encryption, 
the attacker gets much (much!) more value than breaking one that is used 
for authentication.

The fact that the NSA document is unclear on this point has been causing 
problems for many people, including for people inside the NSA.

--Paul Hoffman

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