[DNSOP] Re: on the more general problem of delegating to other namespaces in the DNS

Peter van Dijk <peter.van.dijk@powerdns.com> Fri, 25 July 2025 23:20 UTC

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From: Peter van Dijk <peter.van.dijk@powerdns.com>
To: dnsop <dnsop@ietf.org>
Date: Sat, 26 Jul 2025 01:20:20 +0200
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Subject: [DNSOP] Re: on the more general problem of delegating to other namespaces in the DNS
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With thanks to an astute reader, 3 corrections that do not change the
meat of the problem statement:

On Sat, 2025-07-26 at 00:45 +0200, Peter van Dijk wrote:
> On Tue, 2025-06-17 at 17:44 +0200, Joe Abley wrote:
> > Hi all,
> > 
> > Warren, Wes and I put our respective heads together in Prague and came up with this:
> > 
> >   https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-jabley-dnsop-zone-cut-to-nowhere/
> > 
> > This is some general advice for how to delegate a domain to another namespace.
> 
> Based on my limited understanding of the ACME specification, and
> specifically https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issues/7050 being
> an open, unimplented ticket for Boulder, the Let's Encrypt CA software,

unimplemented, of course.

> I strongly suspect that adding such zone cuts would prevent the
> issuance, via the dns-01 method (which, I think, is the only one
> suitable for issuing certificates for private names), of Let's Encrypt
> certificates.

dns-01 is not the only suitable one, but it appears to be by far the
most popular for this purpose. I believe the problem statement does not
change for other challenge types anyway.

> Longer version: many people run private subdomains of public domains.
> The document clearly recognises that. Some of those people use TXT
> records in the public domain to complete ACME/LE dns-01 challenges to
> generate certificates for those private names. With a zone cut to
> nowhere, there is no place to put those TXT records. The CA/B Baseline
> Requirements allow a successful challenge for example.com to also be
> used to issue a cert for internal.example.com,
> office.internal.example.com, *.internal.example.com, etcetera. But the
> ACME specification as it is written in RFC8855 does not provide this

RFC8555, of course.

> freedom (based on my reading). RFC9444 adds this, but LE has not
> implemented it.
> 
> If I'm wrong, awesome. If I'm right, this may warrant a note in the
> document. I hope somebody better versed in ACME, and specifically Let's
> Encrypt's implementation, can give a more definitive answer.
> 
> I also did not look at other ACME-supporting providers.

Kind regards,
-- 
Peter van Dijk
PowerDNS.com B.V. - https://www.powerdns.com/