Re: [DNSOP] How Slack didn't turn on DNSSEC

Vladimír Čunát <> Wed, 01 December 2021 14:57 UTC

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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] How Slack didn't turn on DNSSEC
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On 01/12/2021 15.49, Mark Andrews wrote:
> Black lies is “QNAME NSEC \000.QNAME NSEC RRSIG”.  There is no churn for "black lies”.  Black lies turns NXDOMAIN into NODATA.
> "DNS Shotgun" can produce churn of NSEC if you ask for a type that is listed as existing but it doesn’t actually exist.  The NSEC returned is still valid for DNSSEC synthesis.

Oh, I'm sorry; a terminological problem.  I used "black-lies" for the 
overall behavior of Cloudflare auths, as described in that blog 
article.  Maybe we could extend the current terminology draft :-D

(Nit: about random QTYPE attacks, I can't see a point when you leave 
random QNAME attacks undefended.)