From nobody Wed Dec 1 06:57:43 2021 Return-Path: X-Original-To: dnsop@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: dnsop@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id BC2A93A03FE for ; Wed, 1 Dec 2021 06:57:41 -0800 (PST) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -3.951 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.951 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, NICE_REPLY_A=-1.852, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=nic.cz Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id qSf4mVva5s0P for ; Wed, 1 Dec 2021 06:57:36 -0800 (PST) Received: from mail.nic.cz (mail.nic.cz [IPv6:2001:1488:800:400::400]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 73C9C3A07A2 for ; Wed, 1 Dec 2021 06:57:34 -0800 (PST) Received: from [IPV6:2001:1488:fffe:6:9c72:9e46:ccd2:7a81] (unknown [IPv6:2001:1488:fffe:6:9c72:9e46:ccd2:7a81]) by mail.nic.cz (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id E24CF1409B9; Wed, 1 Dec 2021 15:57:30 +0100 (CET) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=nic.cz; s=default; t=1638370651; bh=sJxrmJ9RqAbkOo3UnlL/3gdN6fngcEZMLd6nPcPkRDw=; h=Date:To:From; b=ZiBDYeva8rPCZKseGXlHzRL5n+cxF7FCrO0jS4cH0+kZFlHifN1MikbNRzJ2pkHbs 2Z3GBQMS/BnE4hcIQI1iGFA3FcdJva0LR92xhoc6FD8OiWM+zxNzHMBJFLPO51+XeP GuXpx30uzXnSwNaOrrwo4bPR/yml+IVQlZcTjlmU= Message-ID: <840356c1-fcb5-7043-595b-0719bce8428e@nic.cz> Date: Wed, 1 Dec 2021 15:57:30 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:91.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/91.3.2 Content-Language: en-US To: Mark Andrews Cc: dnsop@ietf.org References: <5f987ab1-c28a-b169-becf-1c44bdac60f4@nic.cz> <7b446404-65ec-99b8-7485-3b4b7204ebb7@nic.cz> From: =?UTF-8?B?VmxhZGltw61yIMSMdW7DoXQ=?= In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Virus-Scanned: clamav-milter 0.102.4 at mail X-Virus-Status: Clean Archived-At: Subject: Re: [DNSOP] How Slack didn't turn on DNSSEC X-BeenThere: dnsop@ietf.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: IETF DNSOP WG mailing list List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 01 Dec 2021 14:57:42 -0000 On 01/12/2021 15.49, Mark Andrews wrote: > Black lies is “QNAME NSEC \000.QNAME NSEC RRSIG”. There is no churn for "black lies”. Black lies turns NXDOMAIN into NODATA. > > "DNS Shotgun" can produce churn of NSEC if you ask for a type that is listed as existing but it doesn’t actually exist. The NSEC returned is still valid for DNSSEC synthesis. Oh, I'm sorry; a terminological problem.  I used "black-lies" for the overall behavior of Cloudflare auths, as described in that blog article.  Maybe we could extend the current terminology draft :-D (Nit: about random QTYPE attacks, I can't see a point when you leave random QNAME attacks undefended.)