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Re: [DNSOP] How Slack didn't turn on DNSSEC

Paul Vixie <paul@redbarn.org> Wed, 01 December 2021 18:32 UTC

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From: Paul Vixie <paul@redbarn.org>
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Date: Wed, 01 Dec 2021 10:32:36 -0800
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] How Slack didn't turn on DNSSEC
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two replies here.

Mark Andrews wrote on 2021-12-01 00:35:
> Also stop hiding this breakage. Knot and unbound ignore the NSEC
> records which trigger this when synthesising.  All it does is push
> the problem down the road and makes it harder for others to do proper
> synthesis based on the records returned.

+1. fail early and fail often.

Tim Wicinski wrote on 2021-12-01 03:07:>
> What I noticed in reading this nice write up was the warning image
> they missed in the Route53 console because of the automation they
> use. But most folks use automation/tooling/etc in their workflow,
> and catching those warnings via automation is a bit tricky.
> 
> ...

sadly for the dnssec adoption curve, there is no substitute for knowing 
what you're doing, and automators who wish to scale dnssec management to 
include well-trained non-wizards are going to create disappointment.

-- 
vixie

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