Re: [DNSOP] Favor: Weigh in on draft-ietf-ipsecme-split-dns?

Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> Fri, 30 November 2018 17:21 UTC

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Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2018 12:21:35 -0500 (EST)
From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
To: Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>
cc: draft-ietf-ipsecme-split-dns.all@ietf.org, Tony Finch <dot@dotat.at>, dnsop WG <dnsop@ietf.org>, Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>, Joe Abley <jabley@hopcount.ca>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Favor: Weigh in on draft-ietf-ipsecme-split-dns?
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On Fri, 30 Nov 2018, Ted Lemon wrote:

> Suppose you have a company that has a subdomain that's internal (this is the case where they control the delegation).   The way you make this work is that you publish a signed delegation to the internal
> zone.

That means your public DNS zone must be signed for your internal DNS
zone to be signed? Otherwise you cannot have this signed delegation?
That would mean you cannot run DNSSEC internally before you run it
externally.

>   When you look things up in that zone outside the firewall, you get NXDOMAIN for everything but the SOA on the zone, which returns an old serial number.   Inside the firewall, they get answers, which
> are signed, and which validate.   There's no need for a special trust anchor here.

This scheme seems to require both inside and outside zones are signed
with the same key, or as Mark pointed out, both internal and external
zones need to share their DS records and keep these in sync. As these
are usually different organisations/groups/vendors/services, that is
an actual management problem.

I do not think a protocol should require this manual effort, or add
requirements for where to run DNSSEC first in an organisation.

> So that works if the zone being queried is just nonexistent outside the firewall.   If the zone looks different outside the firewall than inside the firewall, it's a bit more complicated, but essentially
> similar.

With similar problems as above.

>   There are two ways to approach this.   One is to assume that the validator never checks the SOA on the zone.   This is almost certainly the case for nearly any use case.   In that case, you just
> run the internal and external name servers with the same ZSK, and have a delegation above it.   You don't worry about zone serial numbers, because they don't affect validation.   When you're inside the VPN,
> you get answers for the internal zone; when you're outside the vpn, you get answers for the outside.   Both validate, because the DS record(s) are referring to the same ZSK(s).

coordinating shared ZSK's is even harder then requiring sharing DS
records! ZSKs roll every month, and a lot of software auto-generates
and performs the roll without any humans involved. It seems extremely
fragile to need to coordinate ZSKs between different organisations,
be ready for the same algorithm rollovers, etc etc.

> So in this case, there is no need for a special trust anchor, and using one makes you substantially less secure, and hence is not something we should be advising.

I think your proposal is far to fragile to suggest in real enterprise
deployments.

Paul

> 
> On Fri, Nov 30, 2018 at 10:53 AM Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>; wrote:
>       On Thu, 29 Nov 2018, Ted Lemon wrote:
>
>       > On Thu, Nov 29, 2018 at 12:31 AM Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>; wrote:
>       >       How could the use case be more constrained without breaking functionality?
>       >
>       > I discussed this in detail in several previous posts, e.g.:
>
>       > https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dnsop/97xk8Zm1NGpyadZ8lsL3MhRtYGk
>       > https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dnsop/hkRowALa5yT4IoSmqCpdZg4e78I
>
>       Well, you argued for changing things so much that it breaks
>       functionality :) And you would require the VPN client to have
>       some kind of DNSSEC resolving capability before the tunnel is
>       setup. And if those checks need to be done during tunnel setup
>       then there is also a significant delay that would affect on-demand
>       tunnels.
>
>       I especially disagree with your text:
>
>               I think that we should let the field tell us before figuring out how to solve that problem.
>
>       > I explained this in the previous posts.   I would be happy (really!) to help improve the text, but it would be a significant change, and I'm getting the impression from
>       > Warren that he would like to not do that..
>
>       More specifically, the enterprise use case should not be further changed
>       to a more manual problem. In our previous discussions, both with the list
>       and the Security AD, we made it clear that this is as far as we can go
>       without destroying the enterprise use case. That is, let the provisioning
>       provide the list of names for override, give software a chance to warn,
>       and treat it otherwise as trusted enterprise provisioning. It is up to
>       the implementations on how or where they would support internal trust
>       anchors. For example a phone OS could limit this via "enterprise managed"
>       phone modes only and not allow "emailed profiles" to have these trust
>       points.
>
>       >> Have you ever installed a Configuration Profile on iOS device? If your profile contains a VPN profile which contains a PkCS12 it will warn (entity installing this
>       >> can monitor all your traffic) and show you the root CA.
>       >
>       > Yes.   That's a very bad UI flow.   It means that I can just hand you a configuration profile to install, and you can install it easily.   And you will install it—you're
>       > installing it because you want to get something, and when you're presented with "ok" or "cancel," it's going to be very clear to you that "ok" will get you whatever it
>       > is that you want, and "cancel" will not get you what you want.   So even offering the user this choice has created a gigantic attack surface..   I think of UIs like this
>       > as "social engineering enablement UIs."
>
>       Well, this is where rubber meets the road. There is nothing I can come
>       up with that will be rejected by the people who want to see dancing
>       hamsters or playful kittens. An enterprise can hand out phones that
>       are restricted with respect to provisioning and they can control it
>       as they see fit. If such an enterprise wants to support BYOD, they
>       can choose to forbid these trust anchors on those phones and/or
>       limit those VPN connections in other ways.
>
>       If you let random internet companies install profiles with various
>       kinds of super powers, no RFC in the world will stop them.
>
>       Paul
> 
> 
>
>       >  
>       >       The idea of the text is that this can be similarly done and warning you about the domains whitelisted. That would help if it suddenly lists gmail.com or
>       >       yahoo.com. I believe this adds value and is better than not presenting the whitelist. Ignorant users will just click click click regardless and knowledgeable
>       >       users can go “wait a minute”
>       >
>       >
>       > I assume that knowledgable users will do the right thing if given the right information; often these dialogs do not actually give the right information.   But it's the
>       > ignorant users I actually care about, because there are probably three or four orders of magnitude more of them.   As a knowledgable user, UIs like this actually create
>       > a lot of stress for me, because they never actually tell me what they're going to do, and yet I know that if they are doing something other than what I hope they are
>       > doing, clicking "yes" will create a new attack surface on my device.   So I usually click "no," even though it's probably okay to click "yes."   If we want devices to be
>       > more secure, we have to come up with UI flows that get the user what they need without forcing them to choose between "win and get hacked" and "lose and don't get
>       > hacked."
>       >
>       >
> 
> 
>