Re: [DNSOP] Emergency KSK Rollover for locally secure zones.

[Michael StJohns <[e-mail]>]

On 8/3/2017 3:01 PM, Aanchal Malhotra wrote:
> A DNSKEY RRset with pre-published KSK is signed by the old (now 
> compromised) KSK. When the resolver uses RFC 5011 for the trust anchor 
> update, the attacker can inject a new KSK (signed by the compromised 
> KSK). Which KSK is now the new T/rust Anchor /for the resolver?

The resolver trust point trust anchor set contains both the old and 
pre-published stand-by key.   When the old KSK is compromised, you set 
the revoke bit on the old KSK, and sign the DNSKEY RRSet with both the 
revoked KSK and the standby KSK.   The stand by key does not trace its 
trust through the old key except during the process of being added.   
The attempt to inject the new KSK is foiled by revoking the old KSK and 
publishing the revocation before the hold-down time expires for the 
resolver(s).


At some point - ideally quickly after the old KSK revocation - you 
publish a new standby KSK long enough to inject it as a new trust anchor.

Mike