Re: [DNSOP] [Ext] Re: Resolver behaviour with multiple trust anchors

Paul Vixie <paul@redbarn.org> Tue, 31 October 2017 20:00 UTC

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Date: Tue, 31 Oct 2017 13:00:38 -0700
From: Paul Vixie <paul@redbarn.org>
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To: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
CC: Edward Lewis <edward.lewis@icann.org>, Moritz Muller <moritz.muller@sidn.nl>, Ólafur Guðmundsson <olafur@cloudflare.com>, "dnsop@ietf.org" <dnsop@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] [Ext] Re: Resolver behaviour with multiple trust anchors
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Paul Wouters wrote:
> On Tue, 31 Oct 2017, Edward Lewis wrote:
>
...
>>>> ConfiguredKey-trumps-DS
...
>>
>>> It better, it is the only working solution :)
>>
>> Can you elaborate...why would it be the "only" "working" solution?
>
> The idea of the hierarchical model has always been that if you don't
> trust the parent, you can configure keys at the level you want. If
> I don't trust the root, I can put in a trust anchor for .ca. If I
> don't trust .ca, I can put in a trust anchor for nohats.ca.

+1. and this is how DLV worked, for that reason.

> Allowing "any" key to override that would make me vulnerable to all
> my parents, even if I don't want to trust them. I don't want .ca to
> be able to put in a DS for internal.nohats.ca in their TLD and steal
> my traffic. Now, when I run that zone internally and sign it internally,
> and put in the trust anchor, this zone can never be stolen from me by
> a parent.
>
> This has always given the parent keys an enigma problem. Get abused once
> and we will bypass you. Trusting "any" key will no longer allow me to
> untrust a particular zone cut.

+1. all policy is local.

-- 
P Vixie