Re: [DNSOP] Should be signed

Paul Wouters <> Mon, 08 March 2010 15:27 UTC

Return-Path: <>
Received: from localhost (localhost []) by (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2E6413A69AD for <>; Mon, 8 Mar 2010 07:27:28 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.573
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.573 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.026, BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from ([]) by localhost ( []) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id x0ZVDvBRHI7e for <>; Mon, 8 Mar 2010 07:27:26 -0800 (PST)
Received: from ( []) by (Postfix) with ESMTP id C09903A6904 for <>; Mon, 8 Mar 2010 07:27:26 -0800 (PST)
Received: from ( []) by (Postfix) with ESMTP id CB1EDBF7D; Mon, 8 Mar 2010 10:27:29 -0500 (EST)
Date: Mon, 08 Mar 2010 10:27:29 -0500
From: Paul Wouters <>
To: Joe Abley <>
In-Reply-To: <>
Message-ID: <>
References: <2AA0F45200E147D1ADC86A4B373C3D46@localhost> <>
User-Agent: Alpine 1.10 (LFD 962 2008-03-14)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset="US-ASCII"; format="flowed"
Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Should be signed
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: IETF DNSOP WG mailing list <>
List-Unsubscribe: <>, <>
List-Archive: <>
List-Post: <>
List-Help: <>
List-Subscribe: <>, <>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 08 Mar 2010 15:27:28 -0000

On Mon, 8 Mar 2010, Joe Abley wrote:

> Our[*] reasoning so far with respect to signing ROOT-SERVERS.NET can I think be paraphrased as follows:
> - if we sign ROOT-SERVERS.NET it will trigger large responses (the RRSIGs over the A and AAAA RRSets) which is a potential disadvantage

Is it? Is DNSSEC that bad then? Why did we design it that way?

> - however, since the root zone is signed, validators can already tell when they are talking to a root server that serves bogus information

How does that work without ROOT-SERVERS.NET being signed with a known trust anchor?
How does my validating laptop know that the curent wifi is not spoofing a.ROOT-SERVERS.NET to some local IP?

> - signing ROOT-SERVERS.NET would result in potentially-harmful large responses with no increase in security

If it is harmful, we should abandon DNSSEC?

> I also find Jim's point regarding NET rather compelling. If the NET zone is not signed, then validating responses from a signed ROOT-SERVERS.NET zone would require yet another trust anchor to be manually-configured.
> It's hard for me to agree that the aggregate operational complexity involved in those manual trust anchors, and the potential effects of a KSK-roll without synchronised updating of that static configuration, represents a smaller risk than leaving the zone unsigned, at least for now.
> If this logic is faulty then I'd love to hear about it.

I agree about the trust anchor issue. Not so much with some of the statements above it.