Re: [DNSOP] [Ext] Re: Clarifying referrals (#35)

Edward Lewis <edward.lewis@icann.org> Mon, 13 November 2017 14:53 UTC

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From: Edward Lewis <edward.lewis@icann.org>
To: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>, "dnsop@ietf.org" <dnsop@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Ext] Re: [DNSOP] Clarifying referrals (#35)
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Date: Mon, 13 Nov 2017 14:53:38 +0000
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References: <20171112075445.tf2ut5dxzhhnqe7l@mx4.yitter.info> <20171112131831.GA32208@laperouse.bortzmeyer.org> <20171113014445.ncldrwnuuvluecx7@mx4.yitter.info> <5A08FD96.8030907@redbarn.org> <20171113020736.ga7rzgst2hurb56h@mx4.yitter.info> <5A09068A.3030206@redbarn.org> <20171113032640.tbn7icsllm6jeeny@mx4.yitter.info>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] [Ext] Re: Clarifying referrals (#35)
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At the tail of this thread, I'll add my (random) thoughts.

1) Upward referrals are an example of something that started out as a good idea, good intention, but ran into operational problems as the DNS setting changed.  Early, in the late 90's, a popular DNS implementation would chase an upward referral meant to indicate a lame delegation, resulting in an infinite loop in iteration.  (Better coding stopped that.  See also ARIN Policy [proposal] 2002-01 as an artifact of that time.)  Later, upward referrals were seen as a tool in building a flood attack, which is what cause implementations to stop using them as lame delegation notices.

2) I learned this long ago (while implementing ancient DNSSEC code) - the DNS tree is inherently unidirectional.  A parent knows about its children and not vice versa.  DNSSEC wanted to have arbitrary security chains but had to settle for on-tree ("Domain Name System Security (DNSSEC) Signing Authority" aka RFC 3008).  The same issue came into play when trying to design the "Automating DNSSEC Delegation Trust Maintenance" - related to scaling (the parent has to poll the children, not the other way around).  (In "Detecting a Changed CDS/CDNSKEY", the parent either polls or has to have something out-of-DNS-band: " The delegation user interface has a button".)

I.e., trying to see referrals as going anyway but down is an uphill battle.