Re: [DNSOP] [Doh] [EXTERNAL] Re: New I-D: draft-reid-doh-operator

[Brian Dickson <[e-mail]>]

On Mon, Mar 25, 2019 at 10:31 AM Patrick McManus <[e-mail]>
wrote:

>
>
> On Mon, Mar 25, 2019 at 9:37 AM Brian Dickson <
> [e-mail]> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>>>
>>> \Other than blocking all-but-a-few (or all, or a few) DoT servers, I do
>> not believe anyone has proposed explicit downgrade triggers.
>>
>
> that's the downgrade I am referring to
>
>
>
>> Or do you mean, when a DoT connection is blocked by e.g. a firewall (or
>> other network enforcement device), that an RST is generated? I believe the
>> RST requires sequence number validation before it can be processed by the
>> TCP stack, which means the entity doing the RST generally needs to be in
>> the data path. Other than "lucky guess" or "high volume attempts", I don't
>> believe RST to be a serious threat.
>>
>
> path manipulation attacks are real. arp attacks.. bootp attacks.. rouge
> access points. stingray. all kinds of things. unauthenticated network
> packets are just that: unauthenticated. RST (or blackhole) is a good
> indication that a path isn't going to work - its not a good indication of
> who is expressing that policy (or whether it is a policy at all).
>
> Anyhow - I'm really not trying to amp up this thread.. I just felt that
> there were a few relevant points to the discussion that had not been
> introduced.
>

Okay, that's good to know, and I think we are in agreement (i.e. that
inference is a poor substitute for declarations.)

I think that this is an area that needs thought and mechanism development,
possibly aligned with DoT/DoH operation, possibly not (or orthogonal to
them).

Brian