Re: [DNSOP] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-dnsop-server-cookies-04

Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> Wed, 02 December 2020 20:38 UTC

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To: Ondřej Surý <ondrej@isc.org>
Cc: last-call@ietf.org, draft-ietf-dnsop-server-cookies.all@ietf.org, dnsop@ietf.org, secdir@ietf.org
References: <160693121881.9413.5642470305677631145@ietfa.amsl.com> <17AFD6F5-11DA-41BC-8C37-E1893648041D@isc.org>
From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Date: Wed, 02 Dec 2020 20:37:57 +0000
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-dnsop-server-cookies-04
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Hiya,

On 02/12/2020 18:25, Ondřej Surý wrote:
> Stephen,
> 
> ad 1) the performance is crucial for DNS over UDP and PRF such as
> SipHash is more efficient than HMACs. No, it wasn’t consulted with
> CFRG, and I can’t speak for Willem, but I am confident enough to make
> the decision. SipHash is widely used for hash tables virtually
> anywhere now.

The text says that you need a MAC though. Personally, I
think it'd be wiser to (double-)check before using novel
crypto even if the only novelty is use in a standards
track RFC.

> 
> ad 2) we need a value that’s synchronized well enough and monotonic.
> I honestly don’t see any value in using 64-bit value here. Using
> unixtime has a value in itself, it’s a well-known and there’s a
> little room for any implementor to make a mistake in an
> implementation. The interoperability is more important than the
> actual value of the counter. It’s write only counter, nobody is going
> to interpret it after it has been generated, and it’s wide enough to
> prevent brute forcing.

So what happens after 2038? That's really not v. far in the
future any more.

Cheers,
S.

> 
> Cheers, Ondřej -- Ondřej Surý — ISC (He/Him)
> 
>> On 2. 12. 2020, at 18:47, Stephen Farrell via Datatracker
>> <noreply@ietf.org> wrote:
>> 
>> Reviewer: Stephen Farrell Review result: Has Issues
>> 
>> I see two issues here worth checking:
>> 
>> 1. I don't recall SipHash being used as a MAC in any IETF standard
>> before. We normally use HMAC, even if truncated. Why make this
>> change and was that checked with e.g. CFRG? (And the URL given in
>> the reference gets me a 404.)
>> 
>> 2. Is it really a good idea to use a 32 bit seconds since
>> 1970-01-01 in 2020? I'd have thought that e.g. a timestamp in hours
>> since then or seconds since some date in 2020 would be better.
>> 
>> Here's a couple of nits too: - section 1: what's a "strong
>> cookie"? - "gallimaufry" - cute! but not sure it'll help readers to
>> learn that word.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
> 
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