Re: [DNSOP] [dns-privacy] New: draft-bertola-bcp-doh-clients

nalini elkins <> Mon, 11 March 2019 05:35 UTC

Return-Path: <>
Received: from localhost (localhost []) by (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3D80B130F36 for <>; Sun, 10 Mar 2019 22:35:08 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.899
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.899 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIMWL_WL_MED=-0.001, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key)
Received: from ([]) by localhost ( []) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 7o1SC77BJEK4 for <>; Sun, 10 Mar 2019 22:35:05 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from ( [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::22e]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 044DB130F35 for <>; Sun, 10 Mar 2019 22:35:04 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by with SMTP id d24so2837617ljc.12 for <>; Sun, 10 Mar 2019 22:35:04 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed;; s=20150623; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=HjJOl/KImwRPVzc7N0Est7Zsv9CYBlS8C6fffgrhrnw=; b=nRyaDJbaiRWWbs+UZmZnISIm7R1F2BYBTVVcamgmn7Qhe9TuuwS3vAPO9xCkzThABF njltV5HN4AB+R5Y4oa0aXpctwmvMNs73O0CAYCyIv+IBpmFPQYs7DWHFWQqGRVpplKHB D2Z7uw+hKSQNjMphtYErF20y3KJfP2iJ9r4qq/IACCT89Sohf/l7Yx42BA4SErBTAN7p ToZB/HMKxBoZMh+4wpxQ0ig4naOnkve4bEnyjBDIOhZRdcp/zpXn+lDbWzKbKGYapOF8 ldLKiLwLe0fpe41I6O/O/4uaW8ygo5r1HLqRJnNA4/Te4ByJ/lL0je9vC6I+JT+na0W1 lg8w==
X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed;; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=HjJOl/KImwRPVzc7N0Est7Zsv9CYBlS8C6fffgrhrnw=; b=b+43phhYi49EHvwgdjAZDHpZfVEgxIPbzMqhFGGVGEIYw5HppY3aW2fx+vAUg9eG84 7ASkLwgCptgByDpoRCpzNp4Na1nTQRsTgbLGMn1hOyanL5cl9uT3uIlo97fo1eJ83ws3 seyoaJtH3i7WbdCfO0L30XmPWsfwLYyg1gOYZ4Q9xRFjaWSQ78K8mt1Nc1umJtr0MmRz muOqe6rBfHFrdsRuqq+GHr1v4++n1XoPfQdRuJwRWUijUv95vy5Y0TjHk8V28O9mG8fx dyqroUMg+xCOIcslr0NaB8GMkI4P8NSzAV2T5SGMiAlJPSJ2Cpkhy0cg4JjVseXPofdK d0wg==
X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAUqrSCjCmK92MbvFcKrrG9Vq89ONklMMEqzZJw0VM+THRvpTL6W HFrkUQLxHzoy+HiTEeuuPAYSFMXWARk54Jn9AUf4Kg==
X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqxeZn+rf9VLuQZXKmxfMMr7+VAU6kUdKYX1ifz9yw8dazeLZh7ZzwuzebKWPufb6TVwwROSEaAmNNOMjbf9FEU=
X-Received: by 2002:a2e:898e:: with SMTP id c14mr16634915lji.115.1552282502811; Sun, 10 Mar 2019 22:35:02 -0700 (PDT)
MIME-Version: 1.0
References: <> <> <> <> <> <> <>
In-Reply-To: <>
From: nalini elkins <>
Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2019 11:04:59 +0530
Message-ID: <>
To: Paul Vixie <>
Cc: Christian Huitema <>,, Vittorio Bertola <>,,, "Ackermann, Michael" <>, Stephen Farrell <>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="0000000000002be7700583caef88"
Archived-At: <>
Subject: Re: [DNSOP] [dns-privacy] New: draft-bertola-bcp-doh-clients
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: IETF DNSOP WG mailing list <>
List-Unsubscribe: <>, <>
List-Archive: <>
List-Post: <>
List-Help: <>
List-Subscribe: <>, <>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2019 05:35:08 -0000


> (yes, i will be part of a major new project to identify and block all DoH
services, so
> that behavioural security policies can still work, because you may have
> noticed that the internet has never become MORE secure from new tech,
> but it occasionally becomes LESS secure more slowly because of policy.)

I would be very interested, if you are so inclined, to hear more of what
you are thinking.   Is this something you can (are willing to) talk about?

It sounds like a very thought-provoking initiative.


On Mon, Mar 11, 2019 at 10:55 AM Paul Vixie <> wrote:

> Christian Huitema wrote on 2019-03-10 21:14:
> ...
> > There are a bunch of conflicting requirements here, and it would be good
> > to tease out the contradictions. Consider the following cases:
> >
> > 1) I am using my phone, and using application-X.
> >
> > 2) I am at home, using application-X on my home computer.
> >
> > 3) I am using Wi-Fi in a hotel, and using application-X.
> >
> > 4) I am using my work laptop on the enterprise network, and using
> > application-X
> >
> > 5) I am using my work laptop in a hotel, and using application-X
> >
> > 6) I am using my work laptop on the network of a customer, and using
> > application-X.
> this distinction is not useful.
> there are two cases.
> a user or app trusts its network.
> or not.
> in the first case, you'll use an RDNS service which is in the set
> (allowed (preferred)). that is, you'll use the server you desire most
> out of the set that your network operator allows you to reach.
> in the second case, you'll use a VPN, for all of your traffic, not just
> for DNS, because if you hide your DNS but not the connections which
> result from such hiding, it will add no measurable privacy.
> > Today, plenty of people claim the right to control how I use the DNS: my
> > phone carrier, my ISP at home, the company that got the contract to
> > manage the hotel's Wi-Fi, the IT manager for my company's laptop, the IT
> > manager for the company that I am visiting. Out of those, there is just
> > one scenario for which the claim has some legitimacy: if the company
> > pays for my laptop and own the laptop, yes of course it has a legitimate
> > claim to control how I am using it. Otherwise, I, the user, get to
> > decide. If I like the application's setting better than the network's
> > default, then of course I expect those settings to stick.
> this distinction is also false.
> if you are using my network, then it makes no difference which of us
> bought you that laptop. you will use the RDNS i allow you to use. RDNS
> is part of the control plane, and i use it for both monitoring and
> control. sometimes that's so that i can see malware beacon to its C&C.
> sometimes that's so that i can institute parental controls.
> if you don't like my rules, you should vote with your feet, and not
> visit me. because that is the only choice you will have. (yes, i will be
> part of a major new project to identify and block all DoH services, so
> that behavioural security policies can still work, because you may have
> noticed that the internet has never become MORE secure from new tech,
> but it occasionally becomes LESS secure more slowly because of policy.)
> quoting again the salient passage of RFC 8484's self-damning introduction:
> > ... Two primary use cases were considered during this protocol's
> > development. These use cases are preventing on-path devices from
> > interfering with DNS operations, ...
> let me give you advance notice: "i aim to misbehave."[1] that is, _i am
> on-path, and i intend to interfere._ why on earth the IETF decided to
> equate dissidents (of whom there are tens of thousands, all of which
> need full VPN's not just DoH for actual safety) with bots (of which
> there are tens of millions), and set up a war between end users and
> network operators, i will never understand, or try to. now, we fight.
> --
> P Vixie

Nalini Elkins
Enterprise Data Center Operators