[DNSOP] 答复: DNSSEC threshold signatures idea

Davey Song(宋林健) <ljsong@biigroup.cn> Fri, 07 September 2018 07:23 UTC

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From: =?UTF-8?B?RGF2ZXkgU29uZyjlrovmnpflgaUp?= <ljsong@biigroup.cn>
To: =?UTF-8?Q?'Hugo_Salgado-Hern=C3=A1ndez'?= <hsalgado@nic.cl>, "'Steve Crocker'" <steve@shinkuro.com>
Cc: "'dnsop'" <dnsop@ietf.org>, "'Mukund Sivaraman'" <muks@mukund.org>, <dns-operations@dns-oarc.net>, <yuxia@mit.edu>
References: <20180906161252.GA2840@jurassic> <20180906173412.og736bryaeqbwjds@nic.cl> <20180906174926.GA9614@jurassic> <20180906190257.ig6yqgi5fsfepklz@nic.cl> <CABf5zv+-qH+k6Ts6W-+1Z4QsGYYPrtNiqgTL9jgZORcURFQ1vg@mail.gmail.com> <20180906192209.uryzvdyosnjfptmp@nic.cl>
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Date: Fri, 7 Sep 2018 15:23:34 +0800
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I also ask the same question and look for solutions. I do find a statement from a paper (The Honey Badger of BFT Protocols@ CCS 2016) that " if an trusted party is unavailable, then a distributed key generation protocol could be used instead (c.f., Boldyreva [11])."

[11] A. Boldyreva. Threshold signatures, multisignatures and blind
signatures based on the gap-diffie-hellman-group signature
scheme. In Public key cryptographyâA˘TPKC 2003 ˇ , pages
31–46. Springer, 2002

I have no experience on Boldyreva protocol though, but it seems possible without a central service if all participants follow a certain common rule or algorithm.

Davey
> -----邮件原件-----
> 发件人: DNSOP [mailto:dnsop-bounces@ietf.org] 代表 Hugo Salgado-Herná
> ndez
> 发送时间: 2018年9月7日 3:22
> 收件人: Steve Crocker
> 抄送: dnsop; Mukund Sivaraman; dns-operations@dns-oarc.net
> 主题: Re: [DNSOP] DNSSEC threshold signatures idea
> 
> On 15:08 06/09, Steve Crocker wrote:
> > How do you prevent compromise of the central service?
> >
> 
> For the initial setup a physical ceremony is necessary, to check there's no extra
> subkeys and for secure transmision of them. But afterwards there's no need.
> Each node can check the final signature validates with the public key (just like a
> normal signature), and the plain data should be public (DNSKEY rrset).
> 
> In this same first ceremony you can also share simmetric keys for the secure
> transmission of data and signature pieces.
> 
> The system is fault-tolerant as a subset of nodes can fail and the signing
> process can be completed, and you can detect faked sub-signatures.
> 
> Hugo
> 
> > Steve
> >
> >
> > On Thu, Sep 6, 2018 at 3:02 PM, Hugo Salgado-Hernández
> > <hsalgado@nic.cl>;
> > wrote:
> >
> > > On 23:19 06/09, Mukund Sivaraman wrote:
> > > > On Thu, Sep 06, 2018 at 02:34:12PM -0300, Hugo Salgado-Hernández
> wrote:
> > > > > Hi Mukund.
> > > > > I talked about this to Davey in Montreal. There's an
> > > > > implementation in github[1] and presentations in OARC[2] and
> ICANN[3].
> > > >
> > > > Aha so you're the original source :)
> > > >
> > > > > I'm not sure if its being used right now in a live zone, but
> > > > > certainly in labs and testing. There's been some interests with
> > > > > academic institutions, but don't think they're ready yet.
> > > > >
> > > > > We've been trying to focus this technology as a "poor-man" HSM,
> > > > > as having similar security features without buying an expensive HW.
> > > > > But I think the root and similar high-value zones will benefit
> > > > > for having an split of the private key AND the fact of not
> > > > > needing a "root key ceremony" to sign, because you can sign
> > > > > remotely with each piece of the private key, and transmit the "signature
> pieces"
> > > > > to a central place.
> > > > >
> > > > > Hugo
> > > > >
> > > > > [1] https://github.com/niclabs/docker/tree/master/tchsm
> > > > > [2] <https://indico.dns-oarc.net/getFile.py/access?contribId=
> > > 22&sessionId=3&resId=1&materialId=slides&confId=20>
> > > > > [3] <http://buenosaires48.icann.org/en/schedule/wed-dnssec/
> > > presentation-dnssec-cryptographic-20nov13-en>
> > > >
> > > > So this's implemented as a PKCS 11 provider.. interesting. In my
> > > > mind I was thinking along the lines of updates to dnssec-keygen +
> > > > dnssec-signzone + intermediate RRSIG representation using new RR
> > > > type + zone transfers to share intermediate effects.
> > >
> > > In our implementation you'll need a central "orchestrator" who
> > > creates the first key and split the private pieces to each signing
> > > node. This same orchestrator later send signature requests to each
> > > node, collect the signature pieces and defines the "consensus" of
> > > M/N. Finally, there's an PKCS11 interface between this orchestrator
> > > and the zone signing policy machinery (OpenDNSSEC in our setup).
> > >
> > > Hugo
> > >
> > >
> > > _______________________________________________
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> > > DNSOP@ietf.org
> > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
> > >
> > >
> 
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