Re: [DNSOP] signalling mandatory DNSSEC in the parent zone

Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org> Tue, 02 March 2021 11:55 UTC

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From: Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org>
In-Reply-To: <5D1D786F-216A-4AD3-840E-CAFE5CA49B6C@wisser.se>
Date: Tue, 02 Mar 2021 22:55:48 +1100
Cc: Havard Eidnes <he=40uninett.no@dmarc.ietf.org>, ulrich=40wisser.se@dmarc.ietf.org, dnsop@ietf.org, brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com
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To: Ulrich Wisser <ulrich@wisser.se>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] signalling mandatory DNSSEC in the parent zone
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> On 2 Mar 2021, at 22:52, Ulrich Wisser <ulrich@wisser.se> wrote:
> 
> @Håvard No, that isn’t sufficient. A resolver could have the old DNSKEY set in cache but get signatures from the new servers. This can be solved by cross signing the ZSK -> put the ZSK of the other provider in the respective DNSKEY set, no need to exchange private keys, only the DNSKEY records. Then you will always have a validation path.
> 
> @Mark, that is exactly what I am talking about, a forced algorithm change can only work, when both operators cooperate and if we insist on lax-validation. We need both!

It doesn’t even work then as there the signatures of the non DNSKEY records are of the wrong algorithm.

> Cooperation is of course another problem.There is no incentive for the “losing” operator to cooperate. And because today moving a secure domain is a complex manual task, no-one is interested in helping out. We could make this much easier with the right support in protocol and software. Shumon and I will talk on this next week.
> 
> /Ulrich
> 
> 
>> On 1 Mar 2021, at 20:58, Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org> wrote:
>> 
>> Throw a forced algorithm change in on top where neither provider is willing to sign with the other providers algorithm. 
>> 
>> -- 
>> Mark Andrews
>> 
>>> On 2 Mar 2021, at 06:55, Havard Eidnes <he=40uninett.no@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> - Switching providers while staying secure requires
>>>> inter-provider cooperation, including publishing ZSKs from
>>>> both providers in the DNSKEY RRSET served by both providers.
>>> 
>>> What?
>>> 
>>> Maybe I just don't understand the context or conditions here, but
>>> ...
>>> 
>>> Isn't it possible to stand up a new signing and publishing setup
>>> with new ZSKs and new KSKs, and have both the old DS record
>>> pointing to the old setup's KSK and a new DS record pointing to
>>> the KSK of the new setup registered in the parent zone, and then
>>> change the actual delegation (NS records), while still retaining
>>> both the two DS records for a while until the data from the old
>>> setup has timed out?
>>> 
>>> There is then no need to share the secret part of the KSKs or the
>>> ZSKs between the old and the new providers, or to include both
>>> the new and the old ZSKs in the zone.
>>> 
>>> Regards,
>>> 
>>> - Håvard
>>> 
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> DNSOP mailing list
>>> DNSOP@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
>> 
>> _______________________________________________
>> DNSOP mailing list
>> DNSOP@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
> 

-- 
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742              INTERNET: marka@isc.org