Re: [DNSOP] New Version Notification for draft-wessels-dns-zone-digest-01.txt

["Wessels, Duane" <[e-mail]>]

George,


> On Jul 9, 2018, at 4:36 PM, George Michaelson <[e-mail]> wrote:
> 
> There's arguments both sides about cross signing, counter signing and
> independent self-signing. If you want to promote out of band zone
> exchange, it has to be signed. The key it signs with is immaterial if
> you either direct knowledge of the PK in a PKI, or accept a trust
> anchor relationship over it, or a web of trust.

I'm not here to promote out-of-band distribution, but I think its going
to happen (especially for the root zone) and I want something that works
just as well for in- and out-of-band distribution.

I think it makes sense that name server software, whether recursive or
authoritative, can use a technique like this to verify zone data, whether
it is loaded from disk or received over the network.  

The key may be immaterial, but I think the barrier to implementation is
much lower if it can be done with what we already have (DNSSEC) rather than
having to drag something like PGP in.



> So do you prefer (for instance) that the ZSK be used outside of DNSSEC
> to sign a detached signature over the file, irrespective or content
> order, if the file is to be made available?

Sorry I don't quite follow.  What we're suggesting is not a signature over
the file/data, but a hash over the data, which in turn can be signed.

> Because if you basically
> prefer its *not signed* for this mode of transfer, you've stepped

For me the mode of transfer is irrelevant.  My goal is to secure the data,
not the transfer.

> outside the model: you now demand the file is checked on load, element
> by element, against the TA, rather than being integrity checked by a
> MAC signed by the issuer, which permits eg direct binary loadable, or
> other states.

We're not demanding anything (MAY/SHOULD vs MUST) but what we propose is, as
you say, MAC signed by the issuer.

DW


> 
> -G
> 
> On Tue, Jul 10, 2018 at 7:47 AM, Wessels, Duane <[e-mail]> wrote:
>> 
>>> On Jul 8, 2018, at 6:02 PM, George Michaelson <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>> 
>>> So how about use of a PGP key which is a payload in TXT signed over by
>>> the ZSK/KSK so the trust paths bind together?
>>> 
>>> fetch one DNS record +sigs, check against the TA (which has to be a
>>> given) and then..
>> 
>> Currently in the zone digest draft DNSSEC is not mandatory.  That is, the zone
>> needn't necessarily be signed and a receiver need not perform the validation if
>> they don't want to.
>> 
>> Even without DNSSEC the digest gives you a little protection from accidental corruption.  But not from malicious interference of course.
>> 
>> It seems kind of silly to me to double up on public key cryptosystems.  We already have keys attached to zones and software that generates and validates signatures.
>> 
>> DW
>>