Re: [DNSOP] Stephen Farrell's Discuss on draft-ietf-dnsop-5966bis-05: (with DISCUSS)

"Mankin, Allison" <amankin@verisign.com> Thu, 07 January 2016 15:50 UTC

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From: "Mankin, Allison" <amankin@verisign.com>
To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
Thread-Topic: [DNSOP] Stephen Farrell's Discuss on draft-ietf-dnsop-5966bis-05: (with DISCUSS)
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Date: Thu, 07 Jan 2016 15:50:21 +0000
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Stephen Farrell's Discuss on draft-ietf-dnsop-5966bis-05: (with DISCUSS)
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Stephen,

That would work. Thank you for suggesting text; we will go ahead with your suggestion.

Allison

Sent from my iPhone

> On Jan 7, 2016, at 09:45, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
> 
> 
> Hi Alison,
> 
>> On 07/01/16 12:40, Allison Mankin wrote:
>> Hi Stephen,
>> 
>> We're glad you drew this important  point to our attention, but it appears
>> to be needed for draft-ietf-dprive-dns-over-tls rather than this draft. In
>> this draft we don't touch on the privacy/TLS motivation for TCP at all,
>> leaving all that for the dprive draft.
>> 
>> The dprive draft has just completed WGLC. Some of us are authors on both
>> drafts and we'll propose  text on TFO privacy leakage risks to dprive and>> our dprive AD and you.
> 
> That's fine. I guess the only remaining question is whether this
> document, which does discuss TFO, should have some sort of generic
> warning that mixing plaintext and ciphertext is both possible and
> dangerous with a pointer to the dprive draft (as an informative ref)
> saying that the details are part of the dprive work. So perhaps
> adding a sentence to section 9 that says something like:
> 
> "Implementers should be aware that if a DNS privacy mechanism is
> being used then there are significant dangers in mixing unprotected
> query or response data (from TFO) with protected data. See [dprive]
> for the proper way to handle this situation."
> 
> And then [dprive] can say if that kind of mixing is a MUST NOT
> or whatever, once that's figured out.
> 
> Cheers,
> S.
> 
> 
>> 
>> Thanks,
>> 
>> Allison
>>> On Jan 6, 2016 7:09 PM, "Stephen Farrell" <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
>>> 
>>> Stephen Farrell has entered the following ballot position for
>>> draft-ietf-dnsop-5966bis-05: Discuss
>>> 
>>> When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
>>> email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this
>>> introductory paragraph, however.)
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html>>> for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dnsop-5966bis/
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> DISCUSS:
>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Don't we need text warning that TFO is likely problematic
>>> with DNS privacy and that attacks that try to prepend
>>> information (via TFO) to otherwise secured sessions could
>>> occur? While that might sound a bit far-fetched we have
>>> seen exactly that kind of issue with HTTPS that had
>>> practical impact on Webdav. (The TLS renego and then
>>> triple handshake attacks.) So while using TFO may not
>>> enable a slam-dunk CVE level 10 attack, I think you do
>>> need to consider and talk about it. (Or maybe you did and
>>> figured out no attack can work, but then I'd guess you'd
>>> be so happy, you'd say that too:-)
>>> 
>>> I'm not sure how this'd best be resolved, but one thing
>>> might be to talk to the folks thinking about TCPINC as
>>> they have at least hit this as a potential issue for
>>> tcpcrypt and for tcp-use-tls.
>>> 
>>> Otherwise, this is a fine document on which I'll ballot
>>> yes when the above is sorted.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> DNSOP mailing list
>>> DNSOP@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
>