[DNSOP] I-D Action: draft-ietf-dnsop-rfc5011-security-considerations-08.txt

internet-drafts@ietf.org Wed, 29 November 2017 22:14 UTC

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Subject: [DNSOP] I-D Action: draft-ietf-dnsop-rfc5011-security-considerations-08.txt
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A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Domain Name System Operations WG of the IETF.

        Title           : Security Considerations for RFC5011 Publishers
        Authors         : Wes Hardaker
                          Warren Kumari
	Filename        : draft-ietf-dnsop-rfc5011-security-considerations-08.txt
	Pages           : 18
	Date            : 2017-11-29

   This document extends the RFC5011 rollover strategy with timing
   advice that must be followed in order to maintain security.
   Specifically, this document describes the math behind the minimum
   time-length that a DNS zone publisher must wait before signing
   exclusively with recently added DNSKEYs.  It contains much math and
   complicated equations, but the summary is that the key rollover /
   revocation time is much longer than intuition would suggest.  If you
   are not both publishing a DNSSEC DNSKEY, and using RFC5011 to
   advertise this DNSKEY as a new Secure Entry Point key for use as a
   trust anchor, you probably don't need to read this document.

   This document also describes the minimum time-length that a DNS zone
   publisher must wait after publishing a revoked DNSKEY before assuming
   that all active RFC5011 resolvers should have seen the revocation-
   marked key and removed it from their list of trust anchors.

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