Re: [DNSOP] Last Call: <draft-ietf-dnsop-obsolete-dlv-00.txt> (Moving DNSSEC Lookaside Validation (DLV) to Historic Status) to Informational RFC

Michael Sinatra <michael@brokendns.net> Thu, 05 September 2019 21:25 UTC

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To: Paul Vixie <paul@redbarn.org>, dnsop@ietf.org
Cc: draft-ietf-dnsop-obsolete-dlv@ietf.org, dnsop-chairs@ietf.org, IETF Rinse Repeat <ietf@ietf.org>
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From: Michael Sinatra <michael@brokendns.net>
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Date: Thu, 5 Sep 2019 14:25:36 -0700
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Last Call: <draft-ietf-dnsop-obsolete-dlv-00.txt> (Moving DNSSEC Lookaside Validation (DLV) to Historic Status) to Informational RFC
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On 9/5/19 2:07 PM, Paul Vixie wrote:

> sam weiler argued unsuccessfully that trust should not be required to follow
> the delegation path, and with a decade or more of perspective i can see that
> he was right. however, DLV as specified and implemented would not be the
> mechanism i'd propose if non-hierarchical trust had to scale. right now
> private distribution of static trust anchors is working as well as it has to.

I remember scaring a bunch of people at a NANOG meeting by suggesting 
that we should have an alternate method of establishing trust, and that 
method should be non-hierarchical (or perhaps "counter-hierarchical"). 
I believe I used "DLV-like" to describe it and I remember the reactions 
I got (esp from Randy).  My goal was to mitigate risk from anything that 
might cause the root KSK to become bolloxed, like a botched key roll.

Of course, the root KSK roll turned out to be a non-event, due to great 
preparation and plenty of other mitigating steps and ideas, so 
counter-hierarchical trust chains, outside of static TAs, don't seem 
necessary ATM.

TL;DR: Kill it.

michael