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Re: [DNSOP] [Ext] Call for Adoption: draft-hardaker-dnsop-rfc8624-bis, must-not-sha1, must-not-ecc-gost

Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org> Mon, 29 April 2024 23:42 UTC

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From: Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org>
In-Reply-To: <f0f9c0ce-2911-9b4c-0d60-47c204add2d4@nohats.ca>
Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2024 09:42:10 +1000
Cc: Philip Homburg <pch-dnsop-5@u-1.phicoh.com>, "dnsop@ietf.org WG" <dnsop@ietf.org>, Joe Abley <jabley@strandkip.nl>
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To: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] [Ext] Call for Adoption: draft-hardaker-dnsop-rfc8624-bis, must-not-sha1, must-not-ecc-gost
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> On 30 Apr 2024, at 06:00, Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> wrote:
> 
> On Mon, 29 Apr 2024, Philip Homburg wrote:
> 
>> As far as I know there is no second pre-image attack on SHA1, and there
>> will not be one in the foreseeable future.
> 
> Correct.
> 
>> So if we deprecate SHA1 for validators, and assuming validators will follow
>> this advice, and some platforms already stopped validating SHA1, then there
>> may be zones that are mostly secure today that become insecure or bogus
>> when we are done with the draft.
> 
> The advise is split between producing SHA1 signatures and consuming SHA1
> signatures, and those timings do not have to be identical.
> 
> That said, a number of OSes have already forced the issue by failing
> SHA1 as cryptographic operation (RHEL, CentOS, Fedora, maybe more). So
> right now, if you run DNSSEC with SHA1 (which includes NSEC3 using
> SHA1), your validator might already return it as an insecure zone.
 
They DO NOT disable SHA1.  They disable RSASHA1.  The distinction is
important.  NSEC3 works fine on them.  

> I think a MUST NOT for signing with SHA1 is a no-brainer. The timing for
> MAY on validation should be relatively short (eg 0-2 years?)
> 
> For NSEC3 requiring SHA1, that will depend a bit on whether DNS
> validators have rewritten their code to allow the use of SHA1 on
> those systems where it is disabled for "cryptographic reasons". I'm
> not up to date on it, but my suggestion on adding SHA2 for NSEC3 so
> far is not well received. Getting a list of the main resolvers (services
> and software) and whether they properly support NSEC3 w SHA1 would
> be helpful in making such decisions.
> 
> Paul
> 
> _______________________________________________
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> DNSOP@ietf.org
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-- 
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742              INTERNET: marka@isc.org

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