[DNSOP] Re: DNS, censorship, attacks and centralization
Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net> Mon, 19 May 2025 23:31 UTC
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From: Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net>
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Date: Tue, 20 May 2025 09:31:28 +1000
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To: Ben Schwartz <bemasc=40meta.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
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Subject: [DNSOP] Re: DNS, censorship, attacks and centralization
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Hi Ben, That's a good point -- we need to differentiate between what the protocol provides to client software and what that software exposes to end users. Successful mitigation of the attacks we're talking about comes down largely to how (and when) the information is presented to users -- and finding the right way to do it is likely to take some experimentation and iteration. So, to me, constraining what appears in the protocol is not a good way to addressing these risks. Highlighting their nature and suggesting strategies is likely to be more successful. Cheers, > On 20 May 2025, at 12:23 am, Ben Schwartz <bemasc=40meta.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote: > > > From: Mark Nottingham <mnot=40mnot.net@dmarc.ietf.org> > > > First, two things that I don't _think_ are being disputed: > > > 1. Surfacing censorship events to end users is desirable, because it a) avoids user confusion / misattribution of the problem, and b) allows end users to be more fully informed. This is becoming a more urgent problem, thanks to current events. > > I don't necessarily view this as desirable. Specifically, I see an important distinction between informing the user and informing the user agent. > > I feel that informing the user agent is potentially desirable. It can react in various useful ways: > > * Interpreting the censorship as damage and routing around it. > * Collecting anonymized telemetry on censorship events to produce a public report. > * Potentially notifying the user at an appropriate level of detail. > > Surfacing censorship events to the user is often difficult, inappropriate, or counterproductive, depending on factors such as the user's technical skill and the applicable legal frameworks. I am reminded of a string of incidents in Kazakhstan [1], which were successfully resolved without any specific user messaging in client software. Attempting to explain the precise situation to those users might have increased the risk of panic and confusion. > > --Ben > > [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kazakhstan_man-in-the-middle_attack -- Mark Nottingham https://www.mnot.net/
- [DNSOP] Re: Comments from IETF Last Call about dr… Stephane Bortzmeyer
- [DNSOP] Comments from IETF Last Call about draft-… Eric Vyncke (evyncke)
- [DNSOP] Re: Comments from IETF Last Call about dr… Stephane Bortzmeyer
- [DNSOP] Re: Comments from IETF Last Call about dr… Petr Špaček
- [DNSOP] Re: Comments from IETF Last Call about dr… Paul Wouters
- [DNSOP] Re: Comments from IETF Last Call about dr… tirumal reddy
- [DNSOP] Re: Comments from IETF Last Call about dr… tirumal reddy
- [DNSOP] Re: Comments from IETF Last Call about dr… Peter Thomassen
- [DNSOP] Re: Comments from IETF Last Call about dr… tirumal reddy
- [DNSOP] Re: Comments from IETF Last Call about dr… Peter Thomassen
- [DNSOP] Re: Comments from IETF Last Call about dr… tirumal reddy
- [DNSOP] Re: Comments from IETF Last Call about dr… Paul Wouters
- [DNSOP] Re: Comments from IETF Last Call about dr… tirumal reddy
- [DNSOP] Re: Comments from IETF Last Call about dr… tirumal reddy
- [DNSOP] Re: [Last-Call] Re: Re: Comments from IET… Paul Wouters
- [DNSOP] Re: [Last-Call] Re: Re: Comments from IET… Eric Rescorla
- [DNSOP] Re: Comments from IETF Last Call about dr… S Moonesamy
- [DNSOP] Re: Comments from IETF Last Call about dr… S Moonesamy
- [DNSOP] Re: Comments from IETF Last Call about dr… David Adrian
- [DNSOP] Re: [Last-Call] Re: Re: Comments from IET… tirumal reddy
- [DNSOP] Re: [Last-Call] Re: Re: Comments from IET… tirumal reddy
- [DNSOP] Re: [Last-Call] Re: Re: Comments from IET… Paul Wouters
- [DNSOP] Re: Comments from IETF Last Call about dr… Petr Špaček
- [DNSOP] Re: Comments from IETF Last Call about dr… Petr Špaček
- [DNSOP] Re: Comments from IETF Last Call about dr… tirumal reddy
- [DNSOP] DNS, censorship, attacks and centralizati… Mark Nottingham
- [DNSOP] Re: Comments from IETF Last Call about dr… Petr Špaček
- [DNSOP] Re: DNS, censorship, attacks and centrali… Bill Woodcock
- [DNSOP] Re: DNS, censorship, attacks and centrali… Jens Finkhäuser
- [DNSOP] Re: DNS, censorship, attacks and centrali… Ben Schwartz
- [DNSOP] Re: DNS, censorship, attacks and centrali… Mark Nottingham
- [DNSOP] Re: Comments from IETF Last Call about dr… tirumal reddy
- [DNSOP] Re: DNS, censorship, attacks and centrali… Mark Nottingham
- [DNSOP] Re: DNS, censorship, attacks and centrali… S Moonesamy