[DNSOP] Review of draft-ietf-dnsop-7706bis-01.txt

Mukund Sivaraman <muks@mukund.org> Sat, 03 November 2018 10:01 UTC

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Date: Sat, 3 Nov 2018 17:01:11 +0700
From: Mukund Sivaraman <muks@mukund.org>
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Subject: [DNSOP] Review of draft-ietf-dnsop-7706bis-01.txt
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Review comments follow:

> Decreasing Access Time to Root Servers by Running One On The Same Server
>                       draft-ietf-dnsop-7706bis-01

> Abstract

>    Some DNS recursive resolvers have longer-than-desired round-trip
>    times to the closest DNS root server.  Some DNS recursive resolver
>    operators want to prevent snooping of requests sent to DNS root
>    servers by third parties.

It took a while for me to follow this last sentence. It would be better
to rewrite it as "Some DNS recursive resolver operators want to prevent
snooping by third parties of requests sent to DNS root servers."

For a long time I was reading the intention as "... requests sent to DNS
root servers by [the resolver's clients]."

>    Such resolvers can greatly decrease the
>    round-trip time and prevent observation of requests by running a copy
>    of the full root zone on the same server, such as on a loopback
>    address.

I'd substitute "running" with hosting or serving, and s/on the same server/locally/

>    This document shows how to start and maintain such a copy
>    of the root zone that does not pose a threat to other users of the
>    DNS, at the cost of adding some operational fragility for the
>    operator.

s/pose a threat to/cause problems for/

>    This draft will update RFC 7706.  See Section 1.1 for a list of
>    topics that will be added in the update.

>    [ Ed note: Text inside square brackets ([]) is additional background
>    information, answers to freqently asked questions, general musings,
>    etc.  They will be removed before publication.]

>    [ This document is being collaborated on in Github at:
>    https://github.com/wkumari/draft-kh-dnsop-7706bis.  The most recent
>    version of the document, open issues, and so on should all be
>    available there.  The authors gratefully accept pull requests. ]

> Status of This Memo

>    This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
>    provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

>    Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
>    Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
>    working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
>    Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

>    Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
>    and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any




>    time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
>    material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

>    This Internet-Draft will expire on April 25, 2019.

> Copyright Notice

>    Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
>    document authors.  All rights reserved.

>    This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
>    Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
>    (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
>    publication of this document.  Please review these documents
>    carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
>    to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
>    include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
>    the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
>    described in the Simplified BSD License.

> Table of Contents

>    1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
>      1.1.  Updates from RFC 7706 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
>      1.2.  Requirements Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
>    2.  Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
>    3.  Operation of the Root Zone on the Local Server  . . . . . . .   5
>    4.  Using the Root Zone Server on the Same Host . . . . . . . . .   7
>    5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
>    6.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
>      6.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
>      6.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
>    Appendix A.  Current Sources of the Root Zone . . . . . . . . . .   8
>    Appendix B.  Example Configurations of Common Implementations . .   9
>      B.1.  Example Configuration: BIND 9.9 . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
>      B.2.  Example Configuration: Unbound 1.8  . . . . . . . . . . .  10
>      B.3.  Example Configuration: Unbound 1.4 and NSD 4  . . . . . .  10
>      B.4.  Example Configuration: Microsoft Windows Server 2012  . .  11
>    Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
>    Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12

> 1.  Introduction

>    DNS recursive resolvers have to provide answers to all queries from
>    their customers, even those for domain names that do not exist.  For
>    each queried name that has a top-level domain (TLD) that is not in

s/that has a/that is within a/

>    the recursive resolver's cache, the resolver must send a query to a
>    root server to get the information for that TLD, or to find out that

>    the TLD does not exist.  Research shows that the vast majority of
>    queries going to the root are for names that do not exist in the root
>    zone, partially because the negative answers are cached for a much
>    shorter period of time.  A slow path between the recursive resolver
>    and the closest root server has a negative effect on the resolver's
>    customers.

>    Many of the queries from recursive resolvers to root servers get
>    answers that are referrals to other servers.  Malicious third parties
>    might be able to observe that traffic on the network between the
>    recursive resolver and root servers.

This is quoted many times, even in the case of qname minimization. It is
true, but is the amoritized leak of the odd query to the root resulting
in a delegation that big a deal?

A mayor of a city may get a proposal for robocop on every street, and
that could be very effective in completely dismantling crime. But what
if there is no crime in the first place? Deploying robocop then would
still theoretically stop all crime and be a great idea on paper, but is
it necessary?

Is a third party that's observing traffic between root and some resolver
(and not able to observe traffic between the resolver and any other
nameserver) able to do much with the information in the amoritized odd
query from one among a resolver's clients that results in a TLD
delegation? E.g., in the case of a com delegation, the next query for
some other random name within com is 2 days away.

It's not whether they can look at it at all.. is it worth mitigating
that? Is it worth going through the work of deploying root on loopback
and dealing with its corresponding issues for this oft claimed privacy
benefit that appears negligible in risk?

>    This document describes a method for the operator of a recursive
>    resolver to greatly speed these queries and to hide them from
>    outsiders.  The basic idea is to create an up-to-date root zone
>    server on the same host as the recursive server, and use that server
>    when the recursive resolver looks up root information.  The recursive
>    resolver validates all responses from the root server on the same
>    host, just as it would all responses from a remote root server.

As someone else pointed out (was it Ray), does the root zone have to be
on the same host as the resolver? In the case of a resolver farm, can a
shared machine on the LAN be used to host the root zone?

>    The primary goals of this design are to provide faster negative
>    responses to stub resolver queries that contain queries that result

s/stub resolver queries that contain queries that result/stub resolver queries that result/

>    in NXDOMAIN responses, and to prevent queries and responses from
>    being visible on the network.  This design will probably have little
>    effect on getting faster positive responses to stub resolver for good
>    queries on TLDs, because the TTL for most TLDs is usually long-lived
>    (on the order of a day or two) and is thus usually already in the
>    cache of the recursive resolver.

The same analogy can be made for "leaking" queries to the root as above.

>    This design explicitly only allows the new root zone server to be run
>    on the same server as the recursive resolver, in order to prevent the
>    server from serving authoritative answers to any other system.
>    Specifically, the root server on the local system MUST be configured
>    to only answer queries from the resolvers on the same host, and MUST
>    NOT answer queries from any other resolver.

Not sharing the root zone, if possible, on the LAN seems wasted (esp. as
the source of this zone data would be via AXFR).

>    It is important to note that the design described in this document is
>    controversial.  There is not consensus on whether this is a "best
>    practice".  In fact, many people feel that it is an excessively risky
>    practice because it introduces a new operational piece to local DNS
>    operations where there was not one before.  The advantages listed
>    above do not come free: if this new system does not work correctly,
>    users can get bad data, or the entire recursive resolution system
>    might fail in ways that are hard to diagnose.

>    This design requires the addition of authoritative name server
>    software running on the same machine as the recursive resolver.
>    Thus, recursive resolver software such as BIND or modern versions of

>    Unbound do not need to add new functionality, but other recursive
>    resolver software might need to be able to talk to an authoritative
>    server running on the same host.  More recursive resolver software
>    are expected add the capabilities described in this document in th

s/th/the/

>    future.

>    A different approach to solving the problems discussed in this
>    document is described in [RFC8198].

> 1.1.  Updates from RFC 7706

>    RFC 7706 explicitly required that the root server instance be run on
>    the loopback interface of the host running the validating resolver.
>    However, RFC 7706 also had examples of how to set up common software
>    that did not use the loopback interface.  Thus, this document loosens
>    the restriction on the interface but keeps the requirement that only
>    systems running on that single host be able to query that root server
>    instance.

Why is this so?

>    Removed the prohibition on distribution of recursive DNS servers
>    including configurations for this design because some already do, and
>    others have expressed an interest in doing so.

>    Added the idea that a recursive resolver using this design might
>    switch to using the normal (remote) root servers if the local root
>    server fails.

>    [ This section will list all the changes from RFC 7706.  For this
>    draft, it is also the list of changes that we will make in future
>    versions of the daft. ]

>    [ Give a clearer comparison of software that allows slaving the root
>    zone in the software (such as BIND or modern Unbound) versus resolver
>    software that requires a local slaved root zone (older Unbound). ]

>    [ Add a description of Knot's cache-prefilling as way to get the data
>    without having a local authoritative. ]

>    [ Add examples of other resolvers such as Knot Resolver and PowerDNS
>    Recusor, and maybe Windows Server. ]

>    [ Add discussion of BIND slaving the root zone in the same view
>    instead of using different views. ]

>    [ Make the use cases explicit.  Be clearer that a real use case is
>    folks who are worried that root server unavailabilty due to DDoS
>    against them is a reason some people would use the mechanisms here.
>    ]



>    [ Describe how slaving the root zone from root zone servers does not
>    fully remove the reliance on the root servers being available.  ]

>    [ Refresh list of where one can get copies of the root zone. ]

>    [ Other new topics might go here. ]

> 1.2.  Requirements Notation

>    The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
>    "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
>    document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

RFC 8174 has updated RFC 2119. Please check this draft vs. what's in RFC
8174 and update the above paragraph.

> 2.  Requirements

>    In order to implement the mechanism described in this document:

>    o  The system MUST be able to validate a zone with DNSSEC [RFC4033].

Does "validate a zone" mean the entire zone as a whole, or answers
within a zone such as in the activity of a DNSSEC validating resolver?
Asking this because at this point I'm wondering if the root zone's
contents have to be validated.

>    o  The system MUST have an up-to-date copy of the key used to sign
>       the DNS root.

>    o  The system MUST be able to retrieve a copy of the entire root zone
>       (including all DNSSEC-related records).

>    o  The system MUST be able to run an authoritative server for the
>       root zone on the same host.  The root server instance MUST only
>       respond to queries from the same host.  One way to assure not
>       responding to queries from other hosts is to make the address of
>       the authoritative server one of the IPv4 loopback addresses (that
>       is, an address in the range 127/8 for IPv4 or ::1 in IPv6).

>    A corollary of the above list is that authoritative data in the root
>    zone used on the local authoritative server MUST be identical to the
>    same data in the root zone for the DNS.  It is possible to change the
>    unsigned data (the glue records) in the copy of the root zone, but
>    such changes could cause problems for the recursive server that
>    accesses the local root zone, and therefore any changes to the glue
>    records SHOULD NOT be made.

The last sentence seems fine (i.e., not explicitly making changes) but
due to the loosely coupled nature of DNS transfers, it isn't possible to
guarantee that "authoritative data in the root zone used on the local
authoritative server MUST be identical to the same data in the root zone
for the DNS." The local authority may not even be aware of this, and the
data may not be current until the next zone transfer.

> 3.  Operation of the Root Zone on the Local Server

>    The operation of an authoritative server for the root in the system
>    described here can be done separately from the operation of the
>    recursive resolver, or it might be part of the configuration of the
>    recursive resolver system.

>    The steps to set up the root zone are:

>    1.  Retrieve a copy of the root zone.  (See Appendix A for some
>        current locations of sources.)

>    2.  Start the authoritative server with the root zone on an address
>        on the host that is not in use.  For IPv4, this could be
>        127.0.0.1, but if that address is in use, any address in 127/8 is
>        acceptable.  For IPv6, this would be ::1.  It can also be a
>        publicly-visible address on the host, but only if the
>        authoritative server software allows restricting the addresses
>        that can access the authoritative server, and the software is
>        configured to only allow access from addresses on this single
>        host.

I often come across such statements saying "what" without explaining
"why" while reading RFCs. It would be good to provide an explanation
here so that mistakes are not made due to assumptions. Is it for some
type of security?

>    The contents of the root zone MUST be refreshed using the timers from
>    the SOA record in the root zone, as described in [RFC1035].  This
>    inherently means that the contents of the local root zone will likely
>    be a little behind those of the global root servers because those
>    servers are updated when triggered by NOTIFY messages.

This text is better than the "identical" requirement seen earlier.

>    If the contents of the root zone cannot be refreshed before the
>    expire time in the SOA, the local root server MUST return a SERVFAIL
>    error response for all queries sent to it until the zone can be
>    successfully be set up again.  

s/be successfully be/successfully be/

>    Because this would cause a recursive resolver on the same host that
>    is relying on this root server to also fail,

Is the resolver relying on the root server to also fail?

This phrase should be reworded. I suggest "Because this would cause a
recursive resolver, which relies on such a local root server, to also
fail..."

>    a resolver might be configured to immediatly switch to using
>    other (non-local) root servers if the resolver receives a SERVFAIL
>    response from a local root server.

>    In the event that refreshing the contents of the root zone fails, the
>    results can be disastrous.  For example, sometimes all the NS records
>    for a TLD are changed in a short period of time (such as 2 days); if
>    the refreshing of the local root zone is broken during that time, the
>    recursive resolver will have bad data for the entire TLD zone.

>    An administrator using the procedure in this document SHOULD have an
>    automated method to check that the contents of the local root zone
>    are being refreshed; this might be part of the resolver software.
>    One way to do this is to have a separate process that periodically
>    checks the SOA of the root zone from the local root zone and makes

s/the SOA of the root zone from the local root zone/the SOA of the local root zone/

>    sure that it is changing.

>    At the time that this document is
>    published, the SOA for the root zone is the digital representation of
>    the current date with a two-digit counter appended, and the SOA is
>    changed every day even if the contents of the root zone are
>    unchanged.  For example, the SOA of the root zone on January 2, 2018
>    was 2018010201.  A process can use this fact to create a check for
>    the contents of the local root zone (using a program not specified in
>    this document).

> 4.  Using the Root Zone Server on the Same Host

>    A recursive resolver that wants to use a root zone server operating
>    as described in Section 3 simply specifies the local address as the
>    place to look when it is looking for information from the root.  All
>    responses from the root server MUST be validated using DNSSEC.

>    Note that using this simplistic configuration will cause the
>    recursive resolver to fail if the local root zone server fails.  A
>    more robust configuration would cause the resolver to start using the
>    normal remote root servers when the local root server fails (such as
>    if it does not respond or gives SERVFAIL responses).

>    See Appendix B for more discussion of this for specific software.

>    To test the proper operation of the recursive resolver with the local
>    root server, use a DNS client to send a query for the SOA of the root
>    to the recursive server.  Make sure the response that comes back has
>    the AA bit in the message header set to 0.

And perhaps AD=1 ?

> 5.  Security Considerations

>    A system that does not follow the DNSSEC-related requirements given
>    in Section 2 can be fooled into giving bad responses in the same way
>    as any recursive resolver that does not do DNSSEC validation on
>    responses from a remote root server.  Anyone deploying the method
>    described in this document should be familiar with the operational
>    benefits and costs of deploying DNSSEC [RFC4033].

>    As stated in Section 1, this design explicitly only allows the new
>    root zone server to be run on the same host, answering queries only
>    from resolvers on that host, in order to prevent the server from
>    serving authoritative answers to any system other than the recursive
>    resolver.  This has the security property of limiting damage to any
>    other system that might try to rely on an altered copy of the root.

Would it not be possible to relax this so that the draft says that
responses from the local root zone should be ACL'd to known resolvers
that are expected to use this local root service, and return REFUSED
otherwise?

> 6.  References

> 6.1.  Normative References

>    [RFC1035]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
>               specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,
>               November 1987, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035>.

>    [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
>               Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
>               DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
>               <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.



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>    [RFC4033]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
>               Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",
>               RFC 4033, DOI 10.17487/RFC4033, March 2005,
>               <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4033>.

> 6.2.  Informative References

>    [Manning2013]
>               Manning, W., "Client Based Naming", 2013,
>               <http://www.sfc.wide.ad.jp/dissertation/bill_e.html>.

>    [RFC8198]  Fujiwara, K., Kato, A., and W. Kumari, "Aggressive Use of
>               DNSSEC-Validated Cache", RFC 8198, DOI 10.17487/RFC8198,
>               July 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8198>.

> Appendix A.  Current Sources of the Root Zone

>    The root zone can be retrieved from anywhere as long as it comes with
>    all the DNSSEC records needed for validation.  Currently, one can get
>    the root zone from ICANN by zone transfer (AXFR) over TCP from DNS
>    servers at xfr.lax.dns.icann.org and xfr.cjr.dns.icann.org.

>    Currently, the root can also be retrieved by AXFR over TCP from the
>    following root server operators:

>    o  b.root-servers.net

>    o  c.root-servers.net

>    o  f.root-servers.net

>    o  g.root-servers.net

>    o  k.root-servers.net

>    It is crucial to note that none of the above services are guaranteed
>    to be available.  It is possible that ICANN or some of the root
>    server operators will turn off the AXFR capability on the servers
>    listed above.  Using AXFR over TCP to addresses that are likely to be
>    anycast (as the ones above are) may conceivably have transfer
>    problems due to anycast, but current practice shows that to be
>    unlikely.

>    To repeat the requirement from earlier in this document: if the
>    contents of the zone cannot be refreshed before the expire time, the
>    server MUST return a SERVFAIL error response for all queries until
>    the zone can be successfully be set up again.

Please clarify whether the server is the local root zone server or the
resolver server.


> Appendix B.  Example Configurations of Common Implementations

>    This section shows fragments of configurations for some popular
>    recursive server software that is believed to correctly implement the
>    requirements given in this document.

>    The IPv4 and IPv6 addresses in this section were checked recently by
>    testing for AXFR over TCP from each address for the known single-
>    letter names in the root-servers.net zone.

>    The examples here use a loopback address of 127.12.12.12, but typical
>    installations will use 127.0.0.1.  The different address is used in
>    order to emphasize that the root server does not need to be on the
>    device at the name "localhost" which is often locally served as
>    127.0.0.1.

> B.1.  Example Configuration: BIND 9.9

BIND 9.9 and 9.10 are EOL. Please update this section with BIND 9.11.

>    BIND acts both as a recursive resolver and an authoritative server.
>    Because of this, there is "fate-sharing" between the two servers in
>    the following configuration.  That is, if the root server dies, it is
>    likely that all of BIND is dead.

>    Using this configuration, queries for information in the root zone
>    are returned with the AA bit not set.

>    When slaving a zone, BIND will treat zone data differently if the
>    zone is slaved into a separate view (or a separate instance of the
>    software) versus slaved into the same view or instance that is also
>    performing the recursion.

>    Validation:  When using separate views or separate instances, the DS
>       records in the slaved zone will be validated as the zone data is
>       accessed by the recursive server.  When using the same view, this
>       validation does not occur for the slaved zone.

>    Caching:  When using separate views or instances, the recursive
>       server will cache all of the queries for the slaved zone, just as
>       it would using the traditional "root hints" method.  Thus, as the
>       zone in the other view or instance is refreshed or updated,
>       changed information will not appear in the recursive server until
>       the TTL of the old record times out.  Currently, the TTL for DS
>       and delegation NS records is two days.  When using the same view,
>       all zone data in the recursive server will be updated as soon as
>       it receives its copy of the zone.






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>    view root {
>        match-destinations { 127.12.12.12; };
>        zone "." {
>            type slave;
>            file "rootzone.db";
>            notify no;
>            masters {
>                192.228.79.201; # b.root-servers.net
>                192.33.4.12;    # c.root-servers.net
>                192.5.5.241;    # f.root-servers.net
>                192.112.36.4;   # g.root-servers.net
>                193.0.14.129;   # k.root-servers.net
>                192.0.47.132;   # xfr.cjr.dns.icann.org
>                192.0.32.132;   # xfr.lax.dns.icann.org
>                2001:500:84::b; # b.root-servers.net
>                2001:500:2f::f; # f.root-servers.net
>                2001:7fd::1;    # k.root-servers.net
>                2620:0:2830:202::132;  # xfr.cjr.dns.icann.org
>                2620:0:2d0:202::132;  # xfr.lax.dns.icann.org
>            };
>        };
>    };

>    view recursive {
>        dnssec-validation auto;
>        allow-recursion { any; };
>        recursion yes;
>        zone "." {
>            type static-stub;
>            server-addresses { 127.12.12.12; };
>        };
>    };

> B.2.  Example Configuration: Unbound 1.8

>    [ Add a description of Unbound 1.8's "auth-zone" configuration ]

> B.3.  Example Configuration: Unbound 1.4 and NSD 4

>    [ Do we still want this section?  If so, maybe use Know without
>    cache-prefilling. ]]

>    Unbound and NSD are separate software packages.  Because of this,
>    there is no "fate-sharing" between the two servers in the following
>    configurations.  That is, if the root server instance (NSD) dies, the
>    recursive resolver instance (Unbound) will probably keep running but
>    will not be able to resolve any queries for the root zone.
>    Therefore, the administrator of this configuration might want to



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>    carefully monitor the NSD instance and restart it immediately if it
>    dies.

>    Using this configuration, queries for information in the root zone
>    are returned with the AA bit not set.

>    # Configuration for Unbound
>    server:
>        do-not-query-localhost: no
>    stub-zone:
>        name: "."
>        stub-prime: no
>        stub-addr: 127.12.12.12

>    # Configuration for NSD
>    server:
>        ip-address: 127.12.12.12
>    zone:
>        name: "."
>        request-xfr: 192.228.79.201 NOKEY # b.root-servers.net
>        request-xfr: 192.33.4.12 NOKEY    # c.root-servers.net
>        request-xfr: 192.5.5.241 NOKEY    # f.root-servers.net
>        request-xfr: 192.112.36.4 NOKEY   # g.root-servers.net
>        request-xfr: 193.0.14.129 NOKEY   # k.root-servers.net
>        request-xfr: 192.0.47.132 NOKEY   # xfr.cjr.dns.icann.org
>        request-xfr: 192.0.32.132 NOKEY   # xfr.lax.dns.icann.org
>        request-xfr: 2001:500:84::b NOKEY # b.root-servers.net
>        request-xfr: 2001:500:2f::f NOKEY # f.root-servers.net
>        request-xfr: 2001:7fd::1 NOKEY    # k.root-servers.net
>        request-xfr: 2620:0:2830:202::132 NOKEY  # xfr.cjr.dns.icann.org
>        request-xfr: 2620:0:2d0:202::132 NOKEY  # xfr.lax.dns.icann.org

> B.4.  Example Configuration: Microsoft Windows Server 2012

>    Windows Server 2012 contains a DNS server in the "DNS Manager"
>    component.  When activated, that component acts as a recursive
>    server.  DNS Manager can also act as an authoritative server.

>    Using this configuration, queries for information in the root zone
>    are returned with the AA bit set.

>    The steps to configure DNS Manager to implement the requirements in
>    this document are:

>    1.  Launch the DNS Manager GUI.  This can be done from the command
>        line ("dnsmgmt.msc") or from the Service Manager (the "DNS"
>        command in the "Tools" menu).




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>    2.  In the hierarchy under the server on which the service is
>        running, right-click on the "Forward Lookup Zones", and select
>        "New Zone".  This brings up a succession of dialog boxes.

>    3.  In the "Zone Type" dialog box, select "Secondary zone".

>    4.  In the "Zone Name" dialog box, enter ".".

>    5.  In the "Master DNS Servers" dialog box, enter
>        "b.root-servers.net".  The system validates that it can do a zone
>        transfer from that server.  (After this configuration is
>        completed, the DNS Manager will attempt to transfer from all of
>        the root zone servers.)

>    6.  In the "Completing the New Zone Wizard" dialog box, click
>        "Finish".

>    7.  Verify that the DNS Manager is acting as a recursive resolver.
>        Right-click on the server name in the hierarchy, choosing the
>        "Advanced" tab in the dialog box.  See that "Disable recursion
>        (also disables forwarders)" is not selected, and that "Enable
>        DNSSEC validation for remote responses" is selected.

> Acknowledgements

>    The authors fully acknowledge that running a copy of the root zone on
>    the loopback address is not a new concept, and that we have chatted
>    with many people about that idea over time.  For example, Bill
>    Manning described a similar solution but to a very different problem
>    (intermittent connectivity, instead of constant but slow
>    connectivity) in his doctoral dissertation in 2013 [Manning2013].

>    Evan Hunt contributed greatly to the logic in the requirements.
>    Other significant contributors include Wouter Wijngaards, Tony Hain,
>    Doug Barton, Greg Lindsay, and Akira Kato.  The authors also received
>    many offline comments about making the document clear that this is
>    just a description of a way to operate a root zone on the same host,
>    and not a recommendation to do so.

> Authors' Addresses

>    Warren Kumari
>    Google

>    Email: Warren@kumari.net






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>    Paul Hoffman
>    ICANN

>    Email: paul.hoffman@icann.org















































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		Mukund