Re: [DNSOP] Benjamin Kaduk's No Objection on draft-ietf-dnsop-nsec-ttl-04: (with COMMENT)

Peter van Dijk <peter.van.dijk@powerdns.com> Thu, 20 May 2021 08:04 UTC

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From: Peter van Dijk <peter.van.dijk@powerdns.com>
To: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
Cc: draft-ietf-dnsop-nsec-ttl@ietf.org, dnsop-chairs@ietf.org, dnsop@ietf.org, tjw.ietf@gmail.com
Date: Thu, 20 May 2021 10:04:06 +0200
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Benjamin Kaduk's No Objection on draft-ietf-dnsop-nsec-ttl-04: (with COMMENT)
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On Wed, 2021-05-19 at 12:28 +0200, Peter van Dijk wrote:
> Hello Benjamin,
> 
> On Tue, 2021-05-18 at 20:36 -0700, Benjamin Kaduk via Datatracker
> wrote:
> > I don't think I understand what a "deviating value" would be (and in
> > which direction it would deviate).
> 
> This sentence was added because some implementations may need time to
> rework the whole NSEC/NSEC3 chain after a TTL change. The deviation
> would be 'part of the chain still has the old, wrong, value - for a
> while'. I'll ponder better words - suggestions are very welcome, of
> course.

I took Job's text for this, thanks Job!

> > Section 4
> > 
> >    If signers & DNS servers for a zone cannot immediately be updated to
> >    conform to this document, zone operators are encouraged to consider
> >    setting their SOA record TTL and the SOA MINIMUM field to the same
> >    value.  That way, the TTL used for aggressive NSEC and NSEC3 use
> >    matches the SOA TTL for negative responses.
> > 
> > Are there any negative consequences of such a move that would need to be
> > weighed against the stated benefits?
> 
> Signers might use either value (the SOA TTL or the SOA MINIMUM) as a
> default for some other value. For example, PowerDNS uses the SOA
> MINIMUM value as the TTL for DNSKEYs. So, lowering the SOA MINIMUM
> would also lower the DNSKEY TTL (in PowerDNS).
> 
> A quick skim of the BIND dnssec-keygen manual page suggests that BIND
> might sometimes take the SOA TTL as the DNSKEY TTL.
> 
> So, yes, there might be consequences. I will add a note.

I have now added this:

> Note that some signers might use the SOA TTL or MINIMUM as a default
for other values, like the TTL for DNSKEY records. Operators should
consult documentation before changing values.

Kind regards,
-- 
Peter van Dijk
PowerDNS.COM BV - https://www.powerdns.com/