Re: [DNSOP] DNSSEC threshold signatures idea

Steve Crocker <steve@shinkuro.com> Thu, 06 September 2018 19:25 UTC

Return-Path: <steve@shinkuro.com>
X-Original-To: dnsop@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: dnsop@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id BAA71130F02 for <dnsop@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 6 Sep 2018 12:25:27 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.908
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.908 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, T_DKIMWL_WL_MED=-0.01, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=shinkuro-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 4LeONyY2mstY for <dnsop@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 6 Sep 2018 12:25:21 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-yb1-xb2e.google.com (mail-yb1-xb2e.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::b2e]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 57387130F1C for <dnsop@ietf.org>; Thu, 6 Sep 2018 12:25:16 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by mail-yb1-xb2e.google.com with SMTP id k5-v6so4561220ybo.10 for <dnsop@ietf.org>; Thu, 06 Sep 2018 12:25:16 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=shinkuro-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com; s=20150623; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=Aal9kysDeBwM+x9vQ4AcOeYUDSyncuAmBlwUp08FUT4=; b=NNK5NJQow3p/+E4ZOFHfiK2qyXgeNoO1n46MHbTI9FOsy1EXsOBgjKKSgvazIkCMuZ G6k2RBudRKvtWVgkpfpduUpfMW3a6pR3KXUFLS9eKldwQ3D+XRzSk9yVaXmH/Z0+tqh6 wjzt0bD6eFC/HPaUmRHMqAN1ErwMwPxbVJiuFszcSMfPdmmirquEKg3eFvsSSuEnB9aH yMBFymS5DQCZ5UqkWTDFHInRYex8zQQx3Gey3xdGyBN++q7xEj1yuAUKIVV3oulfBhjv 1oKPYv/zgBWqlz4EBdVtxvz4KCNjAJqb2z5onjZa86BgMcPHs6e+rA5o8AR46a5AaJl5 5aWQ==
X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=Aal9kysDeBwM+x9vQ4AcOeYUDSyncuAmBlwUp08FUT4=; b=H7fi2uI4LzN4eV19Hf/O3+GBj201f1meA2euMn97WbaOV5b3EoCH8QEyY9aHmDRNuI iIsBVxNhyh/KlR4YLvh09tLkf6dBgDQdew7b+u3Wv0nFZJ7mlbc0VhQZO/jL+4Tc7Ivt m2XhX9Kxy26dpj10hy8/nYy+0lgqzx3ve/ZvVcTPnqMjhlAxVd5x3PC04i5vLMg4gp6g sFm9jResNFkVhj08++98Z2CDvwUiE9YTquWSYnHzoQdOHzjqNkTwX0BYk1sdaHzSPQMG fWTYf9Adx9N5Q+yL8eyIxJ/2DPezN48xhSbpcdSVU/8XhFuBUg2V25wdTIOJL8eT3quu wM3w==
X-Gm-Message-State: APzg51Akz3E+XPubCTrkFJ8lgEqov4zKCf1i9PqbN+paRWSehXF6XpXL bQlrgGTXVvwAPwW2EJkySgznX3FpBYEnA9FrmTfDjQ==
X-Google-Smtp-Source: ANB0VdYlRoEEHoi3ofSGdOvCBE4CJVnzmdr1dNNfiXXKcJi36M/o7htaX/G0ZPYTdRK9ob11fM7RaPN49qHUj74JT4g=
X-Received: by 2002:a25:ab41:: with SMTP id u59-v6mr2365459ybi.499.1536261915408; Thu, 06 Sep 2018 12:25:15 -0700 (PDT)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Received: by 2002:a25:5d0e:0:0:0:0:0 with HTTP; Thu, 6 Sep 2018 12:25:14 -0700 (PDT)
In-Reply-To: <20180906192209.uryzvdyosnjfptmp@nic.cl>
References: <20180906161252.GA2840@jurassic> <20180906173412.og736bryaeqbwjds@nic.cl> <20180906174926.GA9614@jurassic> <20180906190257.ig6yqgi5fsfepklz@nic.cl> <CABf5zv+-qH+k6Ts6W-+1Z4QsGYYPrtNiqgTL9jgZORcURFQ1vg@mail.gmail.com> <20180906192209.uryzvdyosnjfptmp@nic.cl>
From: Steve Crocker <steve@shinkuro.com>
Date: Thu, 6 Sep 2018 15:25:14 -0400
Message-ID: <CABf5zv+cLT2ifAmS0Bz3FdcKu4DOVV1mpoZgnZ0YS33d5hYg2g@mail.gmail.com>
To: =?UTF-8?Q?Hugo_Salgado=2DHern=C3=A1ndez?= <hsalgado@nic.cl>
Cc: dnsop <dnsop@ietf.org>, dns-operations@dns-oarc.net, Mukund Sivaraman <muks@mukund.org>, "Stephen D. Crocker" <steve@shinkuro.com>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="000000000000c00b88057538d9f1"
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dnsop/tZDme13dl-w1LG0gEKoes6i_zRM>
Subject: Re: [DNSOP] DNSSEC threshold signatures idea
X-BeenThere: dnsop@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: IETF DNSOP WG mailing list <dnsop.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/dnsop>, <mailto:dnsop-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/dnsop/>
List-Post: <mailto:dnsop@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:dnsop-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop>, <mailto:dnsop-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 06 Sep 2018 19:25:28 -0000

Let me flag a key point.  You said this scheme will *detect* faked
signatures.  If you want to *prevent* faked signatures, you need additional
structure.

Steve


On Thu, Sep 6, 2018 at 3:22 PM, Hugo Salgado-Hernández <hsalgado@nic.cl>;
wrote:

> On 15:08 06/09, Steve Crocker wrote:
> > How do you prevent compromise of the central service?
> >
>
> For the initial setup a physical ceremony is necessary,
> to check there's no extra subkeys and for secure transmision
> of them. But afterwards there's no need. Each node can check
> the final signature validates with the public key (just like
> a normal signature), and the plain data should be public
> (DNSKEY rrset).
>
> In this same first ceremony you can also share simmetric
> keys for the secure transmission of data and signature
> pieces.
>
> The system is fault-tolerant as a subset of nodes can fail
> and the signing process can be completed, and you can
> detect faked sub-signatures.
>
> Hugo
>
> > Steve
> >
> >
> > On Thu, Sep 6, 2018 at 3:02 PM, Hugo Salgado-Hernández <hsalgado@nic.cl>;
> > wrote:
> >
> > > On 23:19 06/09, Mukund Sivaraman wrote:
> > > > On Thu, Sep 06, 2018 at 02:34:12PM -0300, Hugo Salgado-Hernández
> wrote:
> > > > > Hi Mukund.
> > > > > I talked about this to Davey in Montreal. There's an implementation
> > > > > in github[1] and presentations in OARC[2] and ICANN[3].
> > > >
> > > > Aha so you're the original source :)
> > > >
> > > > > I'm not sure if its being used right now in a live zone, but
> certainly
> > > > > in labs and testing. There's been some interests with academic
> > > > > institutions, but don't think they're ready yet.
> > > > >
> > > > > We've been trying to focus this technology as a "poor-man" HSM, as
> > > > > having similar security features without buying an expensive HW.
> > > > > But I think the root and similar high-value zones will benefit for
> > > > > having an split of the private key AND the fact of not needing a
> > > > > "root key ceremony" to sign, because you can sign remotely with
> > > > > each piece of the private key, and transmit the "signature pieces"
> > > > > to a central place.
> > > > >
> > > > > Hugo
> > > > >
> > > > > [1] https://github.com/niclabs/docker/tree/master/tchsm
> > > > > [2] <https://indico.dns-oarc.net/getFile.py/access?contribId=
> > > 22&sessionId=3&resId=1&materialId=slides&confId=20>
> > > > > [3] <http://buenosaires48.icann.org/en/schedule/wed-dnssec/
> > > presentation-dnssec-cryptographic-20nov13-en>
> > > >
> > > > So this's implemented as a PKCS 11 provider.. interesting. In my
> mind I
> > > > was thinking along the lines of updates to dnssec-keygen +
> > > > dnssec-signzone + intermediate RRSIG representation using new RR
> type +
> > > > zone transfers to share intermediate effects.
> > >
> > > In our implementation you'll need a central "orchestrator" who
> > > creates the first key and split the private pieces to each
> > > signing node. This same orchestrator later send signature
> > > requests to each node, collect the signature pieces and
> > > defines the "consensus" of M/N. Finally, there's an PKCS11
> > > interface between this orchestrator and the zone signing
> > > policy machinery (OpenDNSSEC in our setup).
> > >
> > > Hugo
> > >
> > >
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > DNSOP mailing list
> > > DNSOP@ietf.org
> > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
> > >
> > >
>
> > _______________________________________________
> > DNSOP mailing list
> > DNSOP@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
>
>