Re: [DNSOP] DNSSEC threshold signatures idea

[Steve Crocker <[e-mail]>]

Let me flag a key point.  You said this scheme will *detect* faked
signatures.  If you want to *prevent* faked signatures, you need additional
structure.

Steve


On Thu, Sep 6, 2018 at 3:22 PM, Hugo Salgado-Hernández <[e-mail]>
wrote:

> On 15:08 06/09, Steve Crocker wrote:
> > How do you prevent compromise of the central service?
> >
>
> For the initial setup a physical ceremony is necessary,
> to check there's no extra subkeys and for secure transmision
> of them. But afterwards there's no need. Each node can check
> the final signature validates with the public key (just like
> a normal signature), and the plain data should be public
> (DNSKEY rrset).
>
> In this same first ceremony you can also share simmetric
> keys for the secure transmission of data and signature
> pieces.
>
> The system is fault-tolerant as a subset of nodes can fail
> and the signing process can be completed, and you can
> detect faked sub-signatures.
>
> Hugo
>
> > Steve
> >
> >
> > On Thu, Sep 6, 2018 at 3:02 PM, Hugo Salgado-Hernández <[e-mail]>
> > wrote:
> >
> > > On 23:19 06/09, Mukund Sivaraman wrote:
> > > > On Thu, Sep 06, 2018 at 02:34:12PM -0300, Hugo Salgado-Hernández
> wrote:
> > > > > Hi Mukund.
> > > > > I talked about this to Davey in Montreal. There's an implementation
> > > > > in github[1] and presentations in OARC[2] and ICANN[3].
> > > >
> > > > Aha so you're the original source :)
> > > >
> > > > > I'm not sure if its being used right now in a live zone, but
> certainly
> > > > > in labs and testing. There's been some interests with academic
> > > > > institutions, but don't think they're ready yet.
> > > > >
> > > > > We've been trying to focus this technology as a "poor-man" HSM, as
> > > > > having similar security features without buying an expensive HW.
> > > > > But I think the root and similar high-value zones will benefit for
> > > > > having an split of the private key AND the fact of not needing a
> > > > > "root key ceremony" to sign, because you can sign remotely with
> > > > > each piece of the private key, and transmit the "signature pieces"
> > > > > to a central place.
> > > > >
> > > > > Hugo
> > > > >
> > > > > [1] https://github.com/niclabs/docker/tree/master/tchsm
> > > > > [2] <https://indico.dns-oarc.net/getFile.py/access?contribId=
> > > 22&sessionId=3&resId=1&materialId=slides&confId=20>
> > > > > [3] <http://buenosaires48.icann.org/en/schedule/wed-dnssec/
> > > presentation-dnssec-cryptographic-20nov13-en>
> > > >
> > > > So this's implemented as a PKCS 11 provider.. interesting. In my
> mind I
> > > > was thinking along the lines of updates to dnssec-keygen +
> > > > dnssec-signzone + intermediate RRSIG representation using new RR
> type +
> > > > zone transfers to share intermediate effects.
> > >
> > > In our implementation you'll need a central "orchestrator" who
> > > creates the first key and split the private pieces to each
> > > signing node. This same orchestrator later send signature
> > > requests to each node, collect the signature pieces and
> > > defines the "consensus" of M/N. Finally, there's an PKCS11
> > > interface between this orchestrator and the zone signing
> > > policy machinery (OpenDNSSEC in our setup).
> > >
> > > Hugo
> > >
> > >
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