Re: [DNSOP] Call for Adoption: draft-wkumari-dnsop-extended-error

Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> Mon, 31 July 2017 13:57 UTC

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Date: Mon, 31 Jul 2017 09:57:11 -0400
From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
To: Evan Hunt <each@isc.org>
cc: Joe Abley <jabley@hopcount.ca>, Shane Kerr <shane@time-travellers.org>, dnsop@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Call for Adoption: draft-wkumari-dnsop-extended-error
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On Sun, 30 Jul 2017, Evan Hunt wrote:

> It's clearly helpful for human debugging.
>
> But, yes, you're correct -- diagnostic information included with a
> SERVFAIL is about as trustworthy as the AD bit, and in the absence of an
> authentication mechanism such as TSIG, clients should not rely on it or
> base policy on it.

But we know people are already building software and systems that DO
trust the AD bit, even with non-localhost resolv.conf entries. This
saves them the overhead of adding a dnssec library to their application,
and saves them from running a system resolving understanding dnssec.

So I'm pretty worried that people will treat new unprotected error
codes exactly the same. They'll handwave and say that's the system
administrator's issue to solve, not the application's responsibility.

> Some of the error codes might be trustworthy enough if you're using COOKIE
> or TCP; that would enusre at least that it wasn't an off-path forgery.

That's a very small use case with pervasive monitoring and
coffeeshop and hotel wifi.

> This should be spelled out in more detail in the security considerations.

I'm seriously afraid that's not going to matter at all when people
implement this.

Paul