[DNSOP] The DNSSEC club and surprises (was Re: New draft: Algorithm Negotiation in DNSSEC)

Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com> Thu, 20 July 2017 15:08 UTC

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From: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>
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Subject: [DNSOP] The DNSSEC club and surprises (was Re: New draft: Algorithm Negotiation in DNSSEC)
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Dear colleagues,

On Mon, Jul 10, 2017 at 06:16:53PM -0400, Shumon Huque wrote:
> negotiation from the beginning, fail open would not have been necessary.
> This fail open behavior frequently takes people not in the DNSSEC club by
> complete surprise. I've lost track of how many "WTF" moments I've had to
> explain to other people about this behavior.

DNSSEC is mostly like that.  I think it is because most people used to
security extensions are used to them in end to end protocols, and used
to failing when the arrangement is not end-to-end.  For instance,
people also express astonishment that DNSKEYs don't expire.  Everyone
always has to be reminded that signatures expire, and if you want to
expire keys you take them out of the zone.

This is not to say, "Stupid users," but instead to say that at least
_part_ of the reason DNSSEC violates a lot of expectations is because
DNS does.  People continue to believe, for example, that there's
always one authoritative server, one recursive, and one stub.  We all
know that's _also_ a bad model, but it's mostly good enough except
when it isn't.

So, I think one can sympathise completely with the "WTF" moments, but
still think the response is, "Yep, this thing violates all your
assumptions.  Sorry."

Best regards,

A

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@anvilwalrusden.com