Re: [DNSOP] UDP fragmentation vs multiple-responses and multi-qtypes

+1

Avoid UDP fragmentations (big response packet) on protocol level could
reduce DDoS defense cost.

Similar to the DNS ANY qtype deprecation.

Ondřej Surý <ondrej.sury@nic.cz>于2017年7月21日周五 上午12:41写道：

> multi-qtypes Security Considerations says:
> >    The method documented here does not change any of the security
> >    properties of the DNS protocol itself.
>
> I don't think this statement is true.  Why?
>
> a) DNS DDoS threats are real and there was a shift towards minimizing
>    answers.  This goes in the reverse direction.  But you address this
>    in both security considerations.
>
> multiple-responses Security Considerations says:
> >
> >    Additional records will make DNS responses even larger than they are
> >    currently, leading to larger records that can be used in DNS
> >    reflection attacks.  One could mitigate this by only serving
> >    responses to EXTRA requests over TCP or when using Cookies [RFC5395],
> >    although there is no easy way to signal this to a client other than
> >    through the use of the truncate bit.
>
> multi-qtypes Security Considerations says:
> >    It should however be noted that this method does increase the
> >    potential amplification factor when the DNS protocol is used as a
> >    vector for a denial of service attack.
>
>
> b) UDP fragmentations - it strongly increases the risk of UDP fragmentation
>    which is strongly discouraged (SHOULD NOT) in BCP 145.
>
> also multiple-responses Security Considerations says:
>
> >    A malicious authoritative server could include a large number of
> >    extra records (and associated DNSSEC information) and attempt to DoS
> >    the recursive by making it do lots of DNSSEC validation.  However,
> >    this is not considered a realistic threat; CPU for validation is
> >    cheap compared to bandwidth.  This can be mitigated by allowing the
> >    recursive resolver to ignore Additional records whenever it considers
> >    itself under attack or its CPU resources are otherwise over-
> >    committed.
>
> It should be noted, that ECC validation is more CPU intensive than RSA, as
> as such I find "CPU for validation is cheap compared to bandwidth" quite
> bold claim that should come with some data.
>
> Cheers,
> --
>  Ondřej Surý -- Technical Fellow
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潘蓝兰  Pan Lanlan