Re: [DNSOP] If DNSSEC signatures do not validate ...

Shumon Huque <shuque@gmail.com> Tue, 28 April 2020 15:50 UTC

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References: <CAAObRXL-hFZ1jFo8dW-+M+2SR8gJ7vypKLMaJNuQJBvCsdJ0Gg@mail.gmail.com> <alpine.LRH.2.21.2004280931470.18623@bofh.nohats.ca> <CAAObRXJKf67Hv8i+fTUWcQMqpk-8hL6PPQ=iXtWnZ8yzk-wNWQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAHPuVdWpqEs+OfVT6Udviyigwegh6416sG5MeaBY_3mf5mpJPw@mail.gmail.com> <CAAObRXK36VVFTXd=_SNje4z3muBvUL3SZa0PmONgu50-V1r7ug@mail.gmail.com> <alpine.LRH.2.21.2004281120160.18623@bofh.nohats.ca>
In-Reply-To: <alpine.LRH.2.21.2004281120160.18623@bofh.nohats.ca>
From: Shumon Huque <shuque@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 28 Apr 2020 11:50:07 -0400
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To: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
Cc: Davey Song <songlinjian@gmail.com>, dnsop <dnsop@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] If DNSSEC signatures do not validate ...
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On Tue, Apr 28, 2020 at 11:22 AM Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> wrote:

> On Tue, 28 Apr 2020, Davey Song wrote:
>
> > OK. It make sense to try every name servers to defend the case if the
> adversary only intercept one path. But the adversary also know the resolver
> will
> > retry other servers. So a smarter adversary may intercept in the
> aggregated upstreaming path where all queries are sent.
>
> Then those adversaries that seem able to block any packets from reaching
> you, can also block 8.8.8.8 and all known DoT and DoH servers by IP ?
> And send you RST packets.
>
> But if the attacks have that much power, they can also just RST all your
> TLS connections to webservers and just let let you have your DNS
> packets.
>
> I think you need to be a little more exact on the attack you are
> describing and what would be a sensible defense.
>
> Paul
>

+1

Davey - if there is a pervasive/omnipresent man-in-the-middle attacker,
then no security protocol (DNSSEC, TLS, HTTPS or any other) can
_prevent_ the attack. All they can do is to _detect_ that an attack is
taking
place (and probably abort).

Shumon.