Re: [DNSOP] [Ext] Re: I-D Action: draft-ietf-dnsop-rfc5011-security-considerations-01.txt

Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org> Fri, 02 June 2017 00:17 UTC

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To: Edward Lewis <edward.lewis@icann.org>
Cc: Michael StJohns <msj@nthpermutation.com>, "dnsop@ietf.org" <dnsop@ietf.org>
From: Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org>
References: <149560445570.28419.14767177653896917226@ietfa.amsl.com> <33126a41-8fb6-b2d9-8d1d-2d6a9a8cf0d5@comcast.net> <ybl60gq9bq2.fsf@wu.hardakers.net> <8AF24B97-BB51-4A1C-8FF2-C53B32552ACA@vpnc.org> <401caf02-5631-de42-489c-8ca3346456a4@nthpermutation.com> <20170526015222.C1FE979B8C4F@rock.dv.isc.org> <2e27b3d9-04f7-c063-1b3a-699a41fa32df@nthpermutation.com> <B5F083EA-D82F-4502-AF3B-46CF46089203@icann.org>
In-reply-to: Your message of "Wed, 31 May 2017 19:44:46 +0000." <B5F083EA-D82F-4502-AF3B-46CF46089203@icann.org>
Date: Fri, 02 Jun 2017 10:16:24 +1000
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] [Ext] Re: I-D Action: draft-ietf-dnsop-rfc5011-security-considerations-01.txt
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In message <B5F083EA-D82F-4502-AF3B-46CF46089203@icann.org>rg>, Edward Lewis writes:
> 
> How many operational instances of "Automated Updates" [RFC 5011] are there?

DLV.ISC.ORG is formally doing RFC 5011.  DLV.ISC.ORG is listed as
a managed-key in named's distribution.  We have not performed a
key rollover however.

> Besides the root zone KSK, I don't know of any.  I do some monitoring of
> DNSSEC practices, years ago I noticed one TLD appearing to follow
> RFC 5011's semantics.  But in recent looks that TLD seems to have
> abandoned the practice (I've never made contact to confirm).  In a scan
> of second-level names a month ago, I found only traces of revoked keys
> (KSK and ZSK!).

You can't tell if a zone is following RFC 5011 or not without asking
the operators or the operators stating so publically.  This statement
really should be published in the DNS.

> I ask because of the issues raised in the thread regarding the number of
> keys assumed in the operation.  Automated Updates apparently (to
> me) was defined with more than one active secure entry point in mind, but
> in practice, the only operating example I've witnessed of Automa
> ted Updates relies on a single active secure entry point.
>
> I've asked around (tool developers) and, so far, no other examples have
> popped up.  I'm sure there are some out there.

-- 
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: marka@isc.org