Re: [DNSOP] [Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-peetterr-dnsop-parent-side-auth-types-00.txt]

Ben Schwartz <bemasc@google.com> Fri, 25 September 2020 03:00 UTC

Return-Path: <bemasc@google.com>
X-Original-To: dnsop@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: dnsop@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id DC2233A0E8F for <dnsop@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 24 Sep 2020 20:00:28 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -17.599
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-17.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIMWL_WL_MED=-0.001, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, ENV_AND_HDR_SPF_MATCH=-0.5, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001, USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL=-7.5, USER_IN_DEF_SPF_WL=-7.5] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=google.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 6lXcvwx9JKgb for <dnsop@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 24 Sep 2020 20:00:26 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-il1-x131.google.com (mail-il1-x131.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::131]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 408B13A0E9B for <dnsop@ietf.org>; Thu, 24 Sep 2020 20:00:26 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by mail-il1-x131.google.com with SMTP id s88so987439ilb.6 for <dnsop@ietf.org>; Thu, 24 Sep 2020 20:00:26 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=ienKoj1asTP8QC4JdZeeDl4ZXhTY2m5i2ILZ3J4EMpA=; b=YKJ4VN/51zTm6ALcKLrKDyj7EGCfZU/iTw7ld8sP+AS4orXlXy+eubfgzvK7V6dU2P soBCqyhhBkbE7y0rslON4ZD4c6ZwWA59iOHEiRfSRLeQI7IxFf0gKNrusUFCLEU5FJ8Y WQzTKCchf9tie58vdqgJqB7wWSyyx7ZDiwNe1R77DcIXhuOPp2zz2BD/Klb8YMet6A38 L4hotyhC9iwsv/J3Ya27Hi3DO3G79BENMmatbmhAja7Py7IFPsOv+Ir4AqvRLI4oe7Gu YIHAYhV4WbEQsWzdO+IxXa+Ko6h6ul/zYrP4vCGUIPn+nRrXoo37zlA2Dgsn7IFHDC4Q p8eg==
X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=ienKoj1asTP8QC4JdZeeDl4ZXhTY2m5i2ILZ3J4EMpA=; b=hhlTkB/cmZpSS38j7sp1HGI2Eap42ED7miOjLrGYjh68qCP5xN1lheDKnfQnNjyj8d UjdiknYGOrzYR4mv3ogxHwdfQgVUgfytuVWSSAuVEZZDl4NTSKq9fVMbncR048pOwfNR 5iVZG8INo1xWedHZXhY1HUEclNINRhEmohpIwDBSMdEca71BID7CZAY9cyIyuJlzzYY5 u2/LV5Sqe9IHRzQGKzFDnLKx63xB53rE+t79i1CuTc02Gx7YCJxG5tR6pcgGt8lhDyNe ZZD3fgvwpuW5gJaR7j+f59/v0BYy5TIZ5LJ/x1pFtJHaFF2YhWwpLETj7++IUU+kjnSY GYpA==
X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM530i+CTi2OrhM85jLWW67n3PY3HPVo8SZtSfWHI+LhIVf+epwIAB S02q19zksVnZY1pjQQmwwZ8IQG0Hm2wrqJB7OmcnuA==
X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJxQY7FCBV/fmwSXvVILp+mAjgvHOoYR3RQT0hgi8cQahFRD23bzfuzVj7KmcPYX0SCU16Hzy5w9lXIh5PwxQqA=
X-Received: by 2002:a92:d58e:: with SMTP id a14mr1502377iln.263.1601002824852; Thu, 24 Sep 2020 20:00:24 -0700 (PDT)
MIME-Version: 1.0
References: <160096974346.12277.16853345396397035889@ietfa.amsl.com> <702a5de3ddcef844aeb80b4c071ee9559aaac650.camel@powerdns.com> <alpine.LRH.2.23.451.2009242244031.1610064@bofh.nohats.ca>
In-Reply-To: <alpine.LRH.2.23.451.2009242244031.1610064@bofh.nohats.ca>
From: Ben Schwartz <bemasc@google.com>
Date: Thu, 24 Sep 2020 23:00:13 -0400
Message-ID: <CAHbrMsA6mV6zc+DimTLqXC038WhDFEmKi7HOWin4Dg1QstwrQg@mail.gmail.com>
To: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
Cc: Peter van Dijk <peter.van.dijk@powerdns.com>, dnsop <dnsop@ietf.org>, hrpc@irtf.org
Content-Type: multipart/signed; protocol="application/pkcs7-signature"; micalg="sha-256"; boundary="000000000000b20c7505b01a847f"
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dnsop/vuIpFX9tGcMMT7guVRgF7SgXk4U>
Subject: Re: [DNSOP] [Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-peetterr-dnsop-parent-side-auth-types-00.txt]
X-BeenThere: dnsop@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: IETF DNSOP WG mailing list <dnsop.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/dnsop>, <mailto:dnsop-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/dnsop/>
List-Post: <mailto:dnsop@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:dnsop-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop>, <mailto:dnsop-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 25 Sep 2020 03:00:29 -0000

Paul,

I would certainly be concerned about such a scenario, but I don't
understand how it's relevant to Peter's proposal.  Couldn't this already be
done today, by simply including such a hypothetical "parent opinion" record
in the glue?

For the scenario you're describing, the present lack of DNSSEC
authentication would not seem to be an obstacle.

--Ben

On Thu, Sep 24, 2020 at 10:53 PM Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> wrote:

>
> [added hrpc to CC: list]
>
> On Thu, 24 Sep 2020, Peter van Dijk wrote:
>
> > When talking to Petr Spacek about this, he came up with the following:
> > -if-, long enough ago, besides DS, a range of RRtype numbers would have
> > been reserved with the same processing rules, i.e. these types live in
> > the -parent- and not on the -child-, then both DSPKI and NS2T could
> > become parent side records through the simple act of requesting an
> > IANA allocation from that special range.
>
> That is an incredibly dangerous idea. It is basically a wildcard from
> the parent to make claims about the child, that the child cannot
> control. You can imagine many kind of RRTYPEs that be be used, eg:
>
> ADULT_CONTENT
> POLITICAL_SPEECH
> GOVERNMENT_BLOCKED
> MONITOR_USERS
> GEOGRAPHIC_CONSTRAINT
>
> Of course, governments can already dictate that ISPs do any of these
> things, but with this proposal you are giving them an awesome censorship
> tool. And anyone not complying to the RFCs implementing these, could be
> in clear violation of the working of the internet and should be punished.
>
> Letting the parent make arbitrary statements about the DNS child is too
> dangerous a tool to roll out.
>
> Partially this can be mitigated by making the registry Internet Standard
> Required, but that would put a lot of pressure on IETF and DNSOP later
> on - pressure that is not technical in nature, but political.
>
> I understand the desire for "if we need the parent to say something
> about the child in the future, we would already have the infrastructure
> running". Indeed, it is a neat idea. But too dangerous.
>
> Paul
>
> > Name:           draft-peetterr-dnsop-parent-side-auth-types
> > Revision:       00
> > Title:          Parent-side authoritative DNS records for enhanced
> delegation
> > Document date:  2020-09-24
> > Group:          Individual Submission
> > Pages:          5
> > URL:
> https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-peetterr-dnsop-parent-side-auth-types-00.txt
> > Status:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-peetterr-dnsop-parent-side-auth-types/
> > Html:
> https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-peetterr-dnsop-parent-side-auth-types-00.html
> > Htmlized:
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-peetterr-dnsop-parent-side-auth-types-00
>
> _______________________________________________
> DNSOP mailing list
> DNSOP@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
>