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Re: [DNSOP] One Chair's comments on draft-wessels-dns-zone-digest

Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> Thu, 02 August 2018 19:14 UTC

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Date: Thu, 02 Aug 2018 15:14:14 -0400
From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
To: Matt Larson <matt@kahlerlarson.org>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] One Chair's comments on draft-wessels-dns-zone-digest
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On Tue, 31 Jul 2018, Matt Larson wrote:

> For all those reasons, I think a checksum in the zone file itself that can be verified with DNSSEC is the best option for this use case, and I like the ZONEMD solution.

Note that the checksum in this case must be at least as
cryptographically strong as the signature algorithm used
in the individual RRSIGs/DNSKEYs. This would have to be
enforced by software/RFC to prevent a downgrade attack.

Paul

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