Re: [DNSOP] [v6ops] [IANA #989438] ipv4only.arpa's delegation should be insecure.

David Schinazi <dschinazi@apple.com> Wed, 13 June 2018 02:28 UTC

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From: David Schinazi <dschinazi@apple.com>
Message-id: <43D81243-B2D8-4622-B03D-D20DB7EC243C@apple.com>
Date: Tue, 12 Jun 2018 19:28:16 -0700
In-reply-to: <FAA35F1A-9AD4-4993-9A5C-53A6143B9DE7@isc.org>
Cc: dnsop <dnsop@ietf.org>, "v6ops@ietf.org WG" <v6ops@ietf.org>, Michelle Cotton via RT <iana-questions@iana.org>, Stuart Cheshire <cheshire@apple.com>
To: Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org>
References: <rt-4.2.9-2607-1515188710-296.989438-6-0@icann.org> <FAA35F1A-9AD4-4993-9A5C-53A6143B9DE7@isc.org>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] [v6ops] [IANA #989438] ipv4only.arpa's delegation should be insecure.
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Hi everyone,

Stuart and I have a draft that attempts to address these issues, please let us know if you think it does or doesn't.

https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-cheshire-sudn-ipv4only-dot-arpa <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-cheshire-sudn-ipv4only-dot-arpa>

Thanks,
David Schinazi


> On Jun 12, 2018, at 18:29, Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org> wrote:
> 
> The Domain Name Reservation Considerations in RFC 7050 do not cover whether
> a delegation should be signed or not.  Due to that omission in constructing the set
> of questions to be asked RFC 7050 fails when the client is behind a validating resolver
> that has NO SPECIAL KNOWLEDGE of IPV4ONLY.ARPA.
> 
> There are 2 pieces of work that are required.
> 1) update the list of questions that need to be asked needs to include whether a delegation
>     needs to be signed or not.
> 2) update RFC 7050 to include explicit instructions to say DO NOT sign IPV4ONLY.ARPA.
> 
> Item 1 is dnsop work as far as I can see.  Item 2, I think, should be v6ops work.
> 
> HOME.ARPA is a example of a unsigned delegation.
> 10.IN-ADDR.ARPA is a example of a unsigned delegation.
> 
> There is zero benefit in IPV4ONLY.ARPA being signed.  Its contents on the Internet
> are well known.  The contents with NAT64 in using are well known except for the
> AAAA query.  The answer to that query is *expected to change*.  That answer cannot
> be validated.
> 
> Mark
> 
>> Begin forwarded message:
>> 
>> From: "Michelle Cotton via RT" <iana-questions@iana.org <mailto:iana-questions@iana.org>>
>> Subject: [IANA #989438] ipv4only.arpa's delegation should be insecure.
>> Date: 6 January 2018 at 8:45:10 am AEDT
>> To: marka@isc.org <mailto:marka@isc.org>
>> Reply-To: iana-questions@iana.org <mailto:iana-questions@iana.org>
>> 
>> Hello,
>> 
>> Following up on a thread from the end of the year.  Who will bring this to the DNSOps working group?  Will someone notify us if there is an consensus on a conclusion of what needs to be done?
>> 
>> Thanks in advance.
>> 
>> --Michelle Cotton
>> 
>> 
>> On Sun Dec 10 22:40:29 2017, danwing@gmail.com <mailto:danwing@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> I had replied to the errata. I agree it warrants additional
>>> discussion, and had also suggested same. Dnsops seems appropriate.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> The question is not to much where the attacker is, but what DNSSEC
>>> guarantee is provided. DNS64 imagines the client could do its own
>>> validation — if it wanted.  To date, effectively zero clients seem to
>>> want to do their own DNSSEC validation.
>>> 
>>> -d
>>> 
>>>> On Dec 10, 2017, at 11:13 AM, Savolainen, Teemu (Nokia-TECH/Tampere)
>>>> <teemu.savolainen@nokia.com <mailto:teemu.savolainen@nokia.com>> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> Hi,
>>>> 
>>>> Dan Wing seem to have moved to VMWare, but cc'ing him now with an
>>>> email address I found from an I-D..
>>>> 
>>>> I'm not really following IETF nowadays, so I don't know if this has
>>>> been discussed.
>>>> 
>>>> Also I'm not sure why ISPs couldn’t first verify the A response's
>>>> validity and then generate AAAA response to the client as document...
>>>> but I suppose it could be considered to be more proper action to
>>>> modify insecure responses than secure responses. I'm just worried
>>>> what happens if there's attacker between ISP and root, in which case
>>>> the IPv4 address part of the response could be modified by attacker
>>>> and then delivered to client in the ISP's synthetic AAAA record..
>>>> 
>>>> So I cannot accept the errata straight away, but it should be
>>>> discussed with people who are more experts on this than I am.
>>>> 
>>>> Best regards,
>>>> 
>>>> Teemu
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>> From: Michelle Cotton via RT [mailto:iana-questions-
>>>> comment@iana.org <mailto:comment@iana.org>]
>>>> Sent: 9. joulukuuta 2017 1:22
>>>> Cc: ietf@kuehlewind.net <mailto:ietf@kuehlewind.net>; spencerdawkins.ietf@gmail.com <mailto:spencerdawkins.ietf@gmail.com>;
>>>> jouni.nospam@gmail.com <mailto:jouni.nospam@gmail.com>; Savolainen, Teemu (Nokia-TECH/Tampere)
>>>> <teemu.savolainen@nokia.com <mailto:teemu.savolainen@nokia.com>>
>>>> Subject: [IANA #989438] ipv4only.arpa's delegation should be
>>>> insecure.
>>>> 
>>>> Hello,
>>>> 
>>>> Just checking to see if anyone had a chance to look at this.
>>>> Dan Wing's email addressed bounced (dwing@cisco.com <mailto:dwing@cisco.com>).
>>>> 
>>>> Thanks,
>>>> Michelle
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>>> On Tue Nov 28 14:43:00 2017, michelle.cotton wrote:
>>>>> Hello Authors and Area Directors,
>>>>> 
>>>>> We have received a message pointing out an errata report that would
>>>>> modify the actions that were performed for RFC7050.
>>>>> 
>>>>> https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.rfc- <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.rfc->
>>>>> 2Deditor.org_errata_eid5152&d=DwIGaQ&c=uilaK90D4TOVoH58JNXRgQ&r=IMDU0f3LtPMQf5XkZ06fNg&m=hjPiqrkJLcvBw1fuqRPXMX6h76vuapCYz_DxRRq7SkM&s=uCKCSggUUCCU7iPuRs-
>>>>> usGcL3T69Fia9gTOy4UQwhLk&e=
>>>>> 
>>>>> Has this report been discussed?  Will the result be an approved
>>>>> errata
>>>>> report or a new RFC?
>>>>> 
>>>>> Thanks in advance.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Michelle Cotton
>>>>> Protocol Parameters Engagement Sr. Manager
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
> 
> -- 
> Mark Andrews, ISC
> 1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
> PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742              INTERNET: marka@isc.org <mailto:marka@isc.org>
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