Re: [DNSOP] zonemd/xhash versus nothing new

Tony Finch <dot@dotat.at> Tue, 31 July 2018 14:59 UTC

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Date: Tue, 31 Jul 2018 15:58:56 +0100
From: Tony Finch <dot@dotat.at>
To: Petr Špaček <petr.spacek@nic.cz>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] zonemd/xhash versus nothing new
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Petr Špaček <petr.spacek@nic.cz> wrote:
> On 30.7.2018 15:32, Tony Finch wrote:
> >
> > I keep thinking it might make sense to sign non-authoritative delegation
> > records, though it's really hard to see how we could get there from here.
> > For instance, there isn't a flags field in RRSIG so you can't explicitly
> > mark an RRset as being non-authoritative.
>
> It is! RRSIG has signer name field which points to node with particular
> DNSKEY. If signer name is shorter than zone apex name the signature was
> created by someone up the tree.

It would be nice if that is enough :-) For NS records the RRSIG signer
will either be the same as the owner (apex RRset) or shorter (delegation
RRset). For glue it's not so clear-cut if you don't have any
apex/delegation records to hand. But maybe the other context is enough -
the section that the records appear in, the RFC 2181 priority order.

The other question I can't answer is whether existing validators will be
discombobulated by an RRSIG of unknown algorithm on a delegation NS
RRset...

Tony.
-- 
f.anthony.n.finch  <dot@dotat.at>  http://dotat.at/
an equitable and peaceful international order