Re: [DNSOP] DNSSEC threshold signatures idea

Steve Crocker <steve@shinkuro.com> Thu, 06 September 2018 19:54 UTC

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From: Steve Crocker <steve@shinkuro.com>
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Date: Thu, 6 Sep 2018 15:54:30 -0400
Cc: dnsop <dnsop@ietf.org>, Mukund Sivaraman <muks@mukund.org>, dns-operations@dns-oarc.net
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References: <20180906161252.GA2840@jurassic> <20180906173412.og736bryaeqbwjds@nic.cl> <20180906174926.GA9614@jurassic> <20180906190257.ig6yqgi5fsfepklz@nic.cl> <CABf5zv+-qH+k6Ts6W-+1Z4QsGYYPrtNiqgTL9jgZORcURFQ1vg@mail.gmail.com> <20180906192209.uryzvdyosnjfptmp@nic.cl> <CABf5zv+cLT2ifAmS0Bz3FdcKu4DOVV1mpoZgnZ0YS33d5hYg2g@mail.gmail.com> <20180906195256.azwvh3x2adgoab6b@nic.cl>
To: =?utf-8?Q?Hugo_Salgado-Hern=C3=A1ndez?= <hsalgado@nic.cl>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] DNSSEC threshold signatures idea
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My focus is on preventing the orchestrator from faking the signatures.

Steve

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> On Sep 6, 2018, at 3:52 PM, Hugo Salgado-Hernández <hsalgado@nic.cl>; wrote:
> 
>> On 15:25 06/09, Steve Crocker wrote:
>> Let me flag a key point.  You said this scheme will *detect* faked
>> signatures.  If you want to *prevent* faked signatures, you need additional
>> structure.
> 
> The orchestrator can detect faked signature pieces when is
> merging them, before going live. So for this definition of
> "prevent" should be sufficient. If you're referring to
> prevent the orchestrator with faking the resulting signature,
> I think we're gonna fail preventing but only reacting after
> detecting it alive.
> 
> Hugo
> 
>> 
>> Steve
>> 
>> 
>> On Thu, Sep 6, 2018 at 3:22 PM, Hugo Salgado-Hernández <hsalgado@nic.cl>;
>> wrote:
>> 
>>>> On 15:08 06/09, Steve Crocker wrote:
>>>> How do you prevent compromise of the central service?
>>>> 
>>> 
>>> For the initial setup a physical ceremony is necessary,
>>> to check there's no extra subkeys and for secure transmision
>>> of them. But afterwards there's no need. Each node can check
>>> the final signature validates with the public key (just like
>>> a normal signature), and the plain data should be public
>>> (DNSKEY rrset).
>>> 
>>> In this same first ceremony you can also share simmetric
>>> keys for the secure transmission of data and signature
>>> pieces.
>>> 
>>> The system is fault-tolerant as a subset of nodes can fail
>>> and the signing process can be completed, and you can
>>> detect faked sub-signatures.
>>> 
>>> Hugo
>>> 
>>>> Steve
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> On Thu, Sep 6, 2018 at 3:02 PM, Hugo Salgado-Hernández <hsalgado@nic.cl>;
>>>> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>>> On 23:19 06/09, Mukund Sivaraman wrote:
>>>>>> On Thu, Sep 06, 2018 at 02:34:12PM -0300, Hugo Salgado-Hernández
>>> wrote:
>>>>>>> Hi Mukund.
>>>>>>> I talked about this to Davey in Montreal. There's an implementation
>>>>>>> in github[1] and presentations in OARC[2] and ICANN[3].
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Aha so you're the original source :)
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> I'm not sure if its being used right now in a live zone, but
>>> certainly
>>>>>>> in labs and testing. There's been some interests with academic
>>>>>>> institutions, but don't think they're ready yet.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> We've been trying to focus this technology as a "poor-man" HSM, as
>>>>>>> having similar security features without buying an expensive HW.
>>>>>>> But I think the root and similar high-value zones will benefit for
>>>>>>> having an split of the private key AND the fact of not needing a
>>>>>>> "root key ceremony" to sign, because you can sign remotely with
>>>>>>> each piece of the private key, and transmit the "signature pieces"
>>>>>>> to a central place.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Hugo
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> [1] https://github.com/niclabs/docker/tree/master/tchsm
>>>>>>> [2] <https://indico.dns-oarc.net/getFile.py/access?contribId=
>>>>> 22&sessionId=3&resId=1&materialId=slides&confId=20>
>>>>>>> [3] <http://buenosaires48.icann.org/en/schedule/wed-dnssec/
>>>>> presentation-dnssec-cryptographic-20nov13-en>
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> So this's implemented as a PKCS 11 provider.. interesting. In my
>>> mind I
>>>>>> was thinking along the lines of updates to dnssec-keygen +
>>>>>> dnssec-signzone + intermediate RRSIG representation using new RR
>>> type +
>>>>>> zone transfers to share intermediate effects.
>>>>> 
>>>>> In our implementation you'll need a central "orchestrator" who
>>>>> creates the first key and split the private pieces to each
>>>>> signing node. This same orchestrator later send signature
>>>>> requests to each node, collect the signature pieces and
>>>>> defines the "consensus" of M/N. Finally, there's an PKCS11
>>>>> interface between this orchestrator and the zone signing
>>>>> policy machinery (OpenDNSSEC in our setup).
>>>>> 
>>>>> Hugo
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> DNSOP mailing list
>>>>> DNSOP@ietf.org
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>> 
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>>> 
>>> 
> 
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