Re: [DNSOP] [internet-drafts@ietf.org: I-D Action: draft-bortzmeyer-dnsop-nxdomain-cut-00.txt]

Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer@nic.fr> Fri, 13 November 2015 19:48 UTC

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Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2015 20:46:15 +0100
From: Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer@nic.fr>
To: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
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References: <20151106082238.GA2307@nic.fr> <A62EC834-C954-446C-9F7A-AB6D1F955C7F@verisign.com> <20151112081514.GA16017@laperouse.bortzmeyer.org> <75FCA3C3-A9F3-4C85-BB45-27DD927210E1@vpnc.org>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] [internet-drafts@ietf.org: I-D Action: draft-bortzmeyer-dnsop-nxdomain-cut-00.txt]
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On Thu, Nov 12, 2015 at 09:54:42AM -0800,
 Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> wrote 
 a message of 43 lines which said:

> If the NXDOMAIN response is not signed, it allows an attacker to
> block resolution of a name that was good, yes?

I do not see why it's new: without DNSSEC, a resolver can be poisoned,
"NXDOMAIN cut" or not. It is the case today.

[The only new thing is the possibility to deny existence of not just a
name but an entire subtree. Again, the solution is to use DNSSEC.]