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Re: [DNSOP] Whiskey Tango Foxtrot on key lengths...

Joe Abley <jabley@hopcount.ca> Thu, 27 March 2014 14:23 UTC

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From: Joe Abley <jabley@hopcount.ca>
In-Reply-To: <0EA28BE8-E872-46BA-85FD-7333A1E13172@icsi.berkeley.edu>
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2014 23:22:42 +0900
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To: Nicholas Weaver <nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Whiskey Tango Foxtrot on key lengths...
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On 27 Mar 2014, at 22:56, Nicholas Weaver <nweaver@icsi.berkeley.edu> wrote:

> Bits are not precious:  Until a DNS reply hits the fragmentation limit of ~1500B, size-matters-not (tm, Yoda Inc).  
> 
> So why are both root and com and org and, well, just about everyone else using 1024b keys for the actual signing?

Those requirements (for the root zone keys) came from NTIA via NIST:

http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/dnssec_requirements_102909.pdf (9)(a)(i)

(well, NIST specified a minimum key size, but the implication at the time was that that was a safe minimum).

Bear in mind, I guess, that these keys have a publication lifetime that is relatively short. The window in which a factoring attack has an opportunity to find a result that can be exploited as a compromise is fairly narrow.


Joe

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