Re: [DNSOP] [Ext] Call for Adoption: draft-hoffman-dnssec-iana-cons

Stephen Farrell <> Mon, 04 January 2021 15:27 UTC

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To: Paul Wouters <>
Cc: Paul Hoffman <>, dnsop <>, Vittorio Bertola <>
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From: Stephen Farrell <>
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Date: Mon, 04 Jan 2021 15:27:46 +0000
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] [Ext] Call for Adoption: draft-hoffman-dnssec-iana-cons
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On 04/01/2021 14:23, Paul Wouters wrote:
> On Mon, 4 Jan 2021, Stephen Farrell wrote:
>> WRT GOST, we're not really talking about an algorithm but
>> rather a national crypto standards scheme that selects sets
>> of algorithms. For such things, whether from Russia or the
>> US or anywhere, I think it's quite fair to ask "how has
>> version N deployment gone?"
> Why is that fair? 

Eh? Seems to me that asking about the facts is fair.
I have a hard time envisaging a way it could be unfair
tbh, so your question surprises me.

> I'd say the community was quite busy and
> possibly made some mistakes in the past. I don't think that
> is a valid barrier for the future. For example, would we
> bar NIST or the US from ever standarizing a new RNG? :P

You seem to be assuming that the goal of asking is to
justify saying "no." That wasn't my intent - I just think
we make better decisions if we know the deployment facts,
rather than our decisions being based on whomever is
good at rhetoric or automatically giving nation-states
or mega-companies whatever they ask.

WRT a new RNG - yes if one was suggested from a US or
any source, then we absolutely should be very careful with
that. Mind you, I can't think of an iana registry that
has RNG algs as entries so maybe it's not a super-good

>> And "how to handle" isn't always "adoption" but could as
>> I said result in deprecating version N if nobody really
>> cares about it - in such a case that'd help implementers
>> and better reflect reality.
> If a national government wants something, we could ask for
> at least one implementation to be planned. 

That was not what I suggested asking. I'd just like to know
if or how much the current gost stuff gets used with dnssec.

> But using this
> meassure as a way to stop these seems wrong. It would move
> the possible standarization from IETF to say openssl or
> bind.
> I do think one issue is how often GOST (or FIPS) updates
> their algorithms and obsoletes older ones. That might
> cause a faster depletion of the registry then we'd like.
> But on the other side, if would be nice if we could become
> faster with obsoleting algorithms too. Why is there still
> RSASHA1 deployed....

Yep. Allocating codepoints for things that don't get used (if
that is the case with gost algs and dnssec which I *still*
don't know any more about), doesn't help us move on from
things that did get used.


> Paul
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