Return-Path: X-Original-To: dnsop@ietfa.amsl.com Delivered-To: dnsop@ietfa.amsl.com Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A35BAC18DB8A for ; Wed, 24 Jul 2024 08:22:29 -0700 (PDT) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -5.507 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-5.507 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_05=-0.5, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-5, RCVD_IN_ZEN_BLOCKED_OPENDNS=0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_NONE=0.001, T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE=-0.01] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Received: from mail.ietf.org ([50.223.129.194]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id AKSVLlmNespK for ; Wed, 24 Jul 2024 08:22:27 -0700 (PDT) Received: from stereo.hq.phicoh.net (stereo.hq.phicoh.net [45.83.6.19]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id EB18DC1840F8 for ; Wed, 24 Jul 2024 08:22:20 -0700 (PDT) Received: from stereo.hq.phicoh.net (localhost [::ffff:127.0.0.1]) by stereo.hq.phicoh.net with esmtp (TLS version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305) (Smail #158) id m1sWdom-0000LzC; Wed, 24 Jul 2024 17:22:16 +0200 Message-Id: To: dnsop@ietf.org From: Philip Homburg Sender: pch-b538D2F77@u-1.phicoh.com References: <7FAF18D5-704E-4052-9767-FDFBB069C2FA@isc.org> In-reply-to: Your message of "Tue, 23 Jul 2024 13:15:41 -0700 ." <7FAF18D5-704E-4052-9767-FDFBB069C2FA@isc.org> Date: Wed, 24 Jul 2024 17:22:14 +0200 Message-ID-Hash: AXRIHRGJGBUVTZD5CCDIK5MUHNA5GPQ7 X-Message-ID-Hash: AXRIHRGJGBUVTZD5CCDIK5MUHNA5GPQ7 X-MailFrom: pch-b538D2F77@u-1.phicoh.com X-Mailman-Rule-Misses: dmarc-mitigation; no-senders; approved; emergency; loop; banned-address; member-moderation; header-match-dnsop.ietf.org-0; nonmember-moderation; administrivia; implicit-dest; max-recipients; max-size; news-moderation; no-subject; digests; suspicious-header X-Mailman-Version: 3.3.9rc4 Precedence: list Subject: =?utf-8?q?=5BDNSOP=5D_Re=3A_IDKEY_and_Keytrap_?= List-Id: IETF DNSOP WG mailing list Archived-At: List-Archive: List-Help: List-Owner: List-Post: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: > And how is this different to migrating to IDKEY? The validator > would need to support DS + IDDS + DNSKEY + IDKEY for a significant > period. One can turn off support for algorithms without the new > semantics. As for *SHA-1 many validators already treat those > algorithms as unsupported. I'm not here to defend IDKEY. As far as I know that is not even a draft. What I'm saying is that we should avoid creating additional DNS protocol code points to deal with collisions. > > 2) Some operators expressed concerns about prohibiting colliding keys, > > especially in multi-signer setups. Delaying the deprecation of current > > algorithms. > > There are several easy ways to address this. IDKEY would require > this to be addressed. Nothing different here. Again I'm not defending IDKEY. Avoiding collisions was discussed earlier this year. As far as I remember there was no consensus among the signing community to have hard requirements against collisions. I don't know if anything has changed in the mean time. But that seems a good place to start. > > 3) My own analysis shows that for reasonable zones there is no need to > > tolerate more than 1 signature verification failure per RRset. So > > the gains are no all that high. > > One failure is one too many. IDKEY and this are about removing > the need to have to process duplicate key ids when validating. > > We have done stuff like this before with the introduction of NSEC3. > It is achievable. NSEC3 was actually desired by people with secure zones. I don't see any desire in that community to avoid collisions. And the gains are just not there.