Re: [DNSOP] Incremental zone hash - XHASH

[Warren Kumari <[e-mail]>]

On Sun, Jul 22, 2018 at 2:51 PM Paul Wouters <[e-mail]> wrote:
>
> On Fri, 20 Jul 2018, George Michaelson wrote:
>
> > The intent (to me at least) is to be able to use exterior fetch, *not*
> > DNS, to source this as a file. curl. wget. ncftp. rsync.
>
> So pull it over HTTPS/TLS and you are good? No bits will be allowed to
> be flipped without the transport security freaking out.
>
> If you are looking at additional trust on the data, we have DNSSEC. If
> you are concerned about glue/NS being unsigned and modified at the
> source, then you need some kind of signature over the data that the
> web server cannot modify.
>
> I see no reason why this should be an RRTYPE though. Especially one that
> can only work in weird automated ways of generating a signature over a
> file which you then modify to add the signature in.
>
> Especially since using an RRTYPE means you are fully relying on DNSSEC
> as the pubkey for signing the data. And if you use DNSSEC, why care
> about unsigned data?
>
> >> Verification of a AXFR ....
>
> Since you dont want to mandate the DNSSEC key on the server serving the
> data, it has to be some external key/checksum/transport security, which
> we already have for *XFR permissions? If *XFR doesn't use that for
> glue/NS, can we not just add a a checksum here based on the XFR keys?
>
> ZONEMD and XHASH seem to be the wrong hammers to use here, unless I
> misunderstood the problem?

One of the original promises of DNSSEC is that I'd be able to find a
zonefile written on a napkin on a bar floor, and trust it -- currently
I cannot do this.

As an example, let's say we'd like to distribute the rootzone over
BitTorrent to people who want to do LocalRoot - how do they know they
can trust the zone file before loading it? Or, in a less crazy
example, distribute it over some set of CDNs - being able to know that
you have the full, and correct zone without having to walk the NSECs
and hope that the glue is correct would (IMO) be nice.
Coordinating keys with just anyone who does an AXFR of a public zone
is not really viable.

W

>
> Paul
>
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-- 
I don't think the execution is relevant when it was obviously a bad
idea in the first place.
This is like putting rabid weasels in your pants, and later expressing
regret at having chosen those particular rabid weasels and that pair
of pants.
   ---maf