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Re: [DNSOP] FIPS 140-3 mode on RHEL 9 and RSA validation of <2048 keys

Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> Mon, 25 April 2022 14:08 UTC

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From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
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Date: Mon, 25 Apr 2022 16:07:51 +0200
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To: Bill Woodcock <woody@pch.net>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] FIPS 140-3 mode on RHEL 9 and RSA validation of <2048 keys
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On Apr 25, 2022, at 15:32, Bill Woodcock <woody@pch.net> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
>> On Apr 25, 2022, at 1:31 PM, Havard Eidnes <he@uninett.no> wrote:
>> 
>>>>> On Apr 25, 2022, at 11:20 AM, Petr Menšík <pemensik@redhat.com> wrote:
>>>>> I think the only good way would be starting considering shorter keys as insecure in FIPS mode.
>>> 
>>> Agreed.  We've been using 2408-bit ZSKs for more than ten years now.  It's definitely time to sunset acceptance of shorter keys at this point.
>> 
>> Well, as Bjørn Mork said, it's one thing to insist on generating own RSA keypairs with >= 2048 bits or convert to using ECDSA, it's quite another to insist that all the rest of the world do this conversion RIGHT NOW.  I'm guessing that changing at least some of these will take a while, not perhaps first and foremost for technical reasons.
> 
> I don’t disagree at all.  But we’re never going to get there if we don’t start.  And there will always be people who don’t get anything done if they’re not pushed.  So I don’t know where that leaves us, other than “we need to start pushing."

I don’t think this is much of a problem either since it’s limited to FIPS mode.

Paul

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