[dnssd] Threat model new version: draft-otis-dnssd-scalable-dns-sd-threats-00.txt

"Hosnieh Rafiee" <ietf@rozanak.com> Thu, 27 August 2015 17:50 UTC

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From: Hosnieh Rafiee <ietf@rozanak.com>
To: dnssd@ietf.org
Date: Thu, 27 Aug 2015 19:50:36 +0200
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Cc: Douglas_Otis@trendmicro.com
Subject: [dnssd] Threat model new version: draft-otis-dnssd-scalable-dns-sd-threats-00.txt
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Dear All,

We have uploaded a new version of threat model. This version replaces two former drafts that are as followings:

draft-otis-dnssd-mdns-xlink
draft-rafiee-dnssd-mdns-threatmodel-03

Please review the draft and let us know whether this version address all the threats and whether or not it is ready for adoption.

Thanks,
Best,
Hosnieh & Douglas



A new version of I-D, draft-otis-dnssd-scalable-dns-sd-threats-00.txt
has been successfully submitted by Douglas Otis and posted to the IETF repository.

Name:		draft-otis-dnssd-scalable-dns-sd-threats
Revision:	00
Title:		Scalable DNS-SD (SSD) Threats
Document date:	2015-08-26
Group:		Individual Submission
Pages:		19
URL:            https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-otis-dnssd-scalable-dns-sd-threats-00.txt
Status:         https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-otis-dnssd-scalable-dns-sd-threats/
Htmlized:       https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-otis-dnssd-scalable-dns-sd-threats-00


Abstract:
   mDNS combined with Service Discovery (DNS-SD) extends network
   resource distribution beyond the reach of multicast normally limited
   by the MAC Bridge.  Since related resources are often not
   authenticated, either local resources are inherently trustworthy or
   are subsequently verified by associated services.  Resource
   distribution becomes complex when a hybrid scheme combines adjacent
   network resources into a common unicast DNS-SD structure.  This
   document explores related security considerations.


                                                                                  


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