[dnssd] Adam Roach's No Objection on draft-ietf-dnssd-prireq-05: (with COMMENT)

Adam Roach via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org> Thu, 05 March 2020 04:50 UTC

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Date: Wed, 04 Mar 2020 20:50:02 -0800
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Subject: [dnssd] Adam Roach's No Objection on draft-ietf-dnssd-prireq-05: (with COMMENT)
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Adam Roach has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-dnssd-prireq-05: No Objection

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Section 3.2:

>   Information conveyed via multicast messages can be
>   obtained by an on-link attacker, while unicast messages are only
>   available to MITM attackers.

I don’t think this is accurate. Given that many of the environments under
consideration (e.g., airport WiFi) use unencrypted wireless transmission
combined with a captive portal. In these cases, an eavesdropper on the same
channel can snoop on even unicast traffic without mounting an MITM attack.



The document speaks of randomization of identifiers, including those commonly
used by users to identify which services they want to connect to. While the
current state of affairs may list a directory such as:

•       Adam’s iPhone
•       David’s Google Pixel 3
•       Alice’s Laptop

(allowing me to select something based on its published name)

This document seems to propose a future state where such directories are
instead presented as:

•       {da566203-0320-4604-aa14-f58ae7bea00c}
•       {6c0952a5-a573-4d92-9d4a-a4bc111a35d8}
•       {785bed6b-1355-4e7e-ad57-b5ce27e83e56}

I find it a bit surprising that this document doesn’t include at least a
cursory mention of the difficulty users may have in device rendezvous under
such a scheme and potential solutions to such issues (e.g., using RFID or QR
codes to provide pairing information).