Re: [dnssd] Threat model - answer to questions

Douglas Otis <doug.mtview@gmail.com> Wed, 19 November 2014 23:48 UTC

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From: Douglas Otis <doug.mtview@gmail.com>
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Date: Wed, 19 Nov 2014 15:48:47 -0800
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To: Hosnieh Rafiee <hosnieh.rafiee@huawei.com>
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Subject: Re: [dnssd] Threat model - answer to questions
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On Nov 14, 2014, at 7:08 AM, Hosnieh Rafiee <hosnieh.rafiee@huawei.com> wrote:

> 5- overlay networks and SSD (Douglas)
> 
> Answer: I still do not understand what is the relationship of overlay networks to SSD. This was the case I did not know what to answer to your question. Why should we consider this? What will happen if we do not consider this?

Dear Hosnieh,

For resource constrained devices, security is best enforced by use of ULA address space defined by RFC4193.  Few CPE devices conforming with RFC7084 permit address specific exceptions for externally initiated sessions.  This limitation makes external exposure either a default accept or deny setting.  ULAs offer a means for resource constrained devices to make exceptions for traffic within its domain.  Otherwise, exclusion of all external initiated sessions might inhibit domain connectivity.

ULA is not an IPv6 version of RFC1918 address space normally combined with NAT/NAPT for Internet connectivity.  ULAs do not require translations since first hop communications can leverage IPv6’s default support of multiple-addresses-per-interface.  This permits network overlays rather than address translation techniques.  An overlay can be achieved by using centrally or locally assigned ULA prefixes (FC00::/8 or FD00::/8).  Apple currently represents the largest deployment of locally assigned ULA prefixes in their Back-to-My-Mac feature by making use of L2TP tunneling.

A ULA prefix is not to be advertised outside a given domain used by agreement of those networked within the domain. Administrators need to clearly set the scope of the ULAs and configure ACLs on relevant border routers to enforce their scope. If internal DNS is used, administrators should use internal-only DNS names for ULAs and might need to use split horizon DNS to ensure internal names do not resolve on the Internet as described in RFC6950.

To maintain security, address preference rules employed by a proxy device should properly consider use of ULAs as described by RFC7368.  Per section 2.4, a device should only use its ULA address within its domain. Even where multiple /48 ULA prefixes are in use within a single domain, as may occur when there are multiple Internet uplinks, utilizing a ULA source address and a ULA destination address from two disjoint internal ULA prefixes should still be preferred over use of GUAs.  When a device has not been specifically enabled to be externally accessible, mDNS proxy into DNS should not publish associated GUAs.

Omitting proper address selection rules is unlikely to obtain the desired security.  This consideration was omitted in both the Hybrid Proxy and Security Threat documents.  

Note: Last hop security depends on header compliance with RA Guard RFC7113. 

Regards,
Douglas Otis