Re: [Doh] panel discussion on DoH/DoC

Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com> Thu, 07 February 2019 13:52 UTC

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From: Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>
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Date: Thu, 7 Feb 2019 13:51:54 +0000
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To: Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>
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Subject: Re: [Doh] panel discussion on DoH/DoC
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> On 7 Feb 2019, at 13:08, Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com> wrote:
> 
> There isn’t a criticism in here from me—it seems clear that DoC is something that exists or doesn’t based on what browser vendors do, and if we really care about it, the knob we have to turn is not not having the specification, but rather being selective in what browsers we use, or in how they are configured.

Up to a point Ted. However we’d be missing *a lot* if the focus was just on those configuration and control hooks for web browsers. Suppose OS vendors use DoH/DoC instead of (the equivalent of) libresolv. Then there are all the web-based apps on our smartphones. Can I trust my bank to pick the right trusted DoH/DoC provider? Or will these just use whatever Apple and google decide are the trusted defaults for iOS and Android? For some definition of trust..,

These sorts of meta-issues need to be documented and I think this WG might be the best place to do that.